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ABSTRACT 
The dual need to discover new sources of energy and to achieve 
energy self-sufficiency has resulted in a search for petroleum 
resources in the North American Arctic by the United States, 
Canada, and Great Britain. Petroleum has been discovered in many 
localities on land, and increasingly, offshore. A number of these 
are potential commercial fields. A considerable amount of 
development has already taken place, and full production will be 
possible at many of the sites by the early 1990s. 
However, transport systems to bring this new found wealth 
to world markets are as yet far from fully developed, and are 
a problem. While there are two and possibly three potential 
transport technologies, all are e4pensive, high risk "mega-
projects" which are unlikely to be ready for transporting the 
petroleum when it is ready to be transported. 
The author presents what he believes to be a more versatile 
and economically viable transport technology: the Arctic Transport 
Submarine. The Arctic submarine, the history of which is given 
in the first chapters, is an accomplished fact. Its modification 
for commercial purposes, given in a later chapter, can be readily 
achieved. The author reviews: High Arctic petroleum finds and 
developments, particularly offshore; the characteristics of the 
"mega-project" alternatives (pipelines, ice-breaker tankers, and 
giant submarine tankers), existent and proposed; and the obstacles--
financial, political, environmental and physical--that confront 
any potential Arctic Transport developer. He discusses the 
advantages and vulnerabilities of each of the transport technologies 
V 
in face of these obstacles; and concludes with why a prototype 
"Arctic" submarine, with or without towed cargo containers, 
is now deserving of developmental attention. 
vi 
INTRODUCTION 
Oil , the principal source of en ergy upon which the 
industrialized countries of the world rely, was until a decade 
ago , cheap , easily transported, and abundant . As the industrial 
nations continued to grow economically, so did their consumption 
of oil, and they found themselves increasingly dependent upon 
imported petroleum to meet their needs. Their economies became 
increasingly sensitive to fluctuations in the price of oil and 
natural gas, which in turn were/are determined in large part by 
fluctuations in Middle Eastern politics. The result, a recession 
world-wide, provided motivation to change the situation. 
Nations such as the United States , Canada and Great Britain 
began searching for new sources of energy closer to home in an 
effort to gain energy self-sufficiency . In the north, this led 
to the discovery of major producing oil fields, such as Prudhoe Bay 
and the expansion of the existing Norman Wells field. Unfortunately, 
however, dependency upon imported sources continued to increase, 
with the result that the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973- 74, during which 
prices quadrupled in less than a year , from $3.00 to %12.00 per 
barrel (British Petroleum , 1977) , had a traumatic effect on most 
economi es . This , and the e f fe ct s of the I r anian Revolution in 
1979 , plus the steady increase in the price of crude oil throughout , 
provided even further incent i ve to continue exploration for 
petroleum . A number of o i l arid gas deposits have now been located 
in the North Amer i can Arc tic , and exploration is con t inuing . 
Increasingly, petrol eum is being sought of fshore, in deeper and 
deeper waters, and the resul ts are pr omis i ng . 
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To date, almost two billion dollars have been spent in the 
United States and Canada in the exploration and development of 
the petroleum resources of the Arctic. And yet, not a single cent 
has been earned in return . This is largely because there are at 
present, no means of delivering the petroleum from the Arctic to 
world markets. Just what would prove a safe and reliable transport 
in this severe environment has not been as obvious as the pipeline 
is for Prudhoe Bay and Norman Wells. Industry and government are 
considering several alternatives, but no full scale construction 
or procurement programs have as yet been launched. 
The three major transport technologies which have been the 
subject of formal proposals so far are: pipelines; ice-breaker 
tankers; and very recently, a submarine super- tanker. Their 
characteristics , advantages and disadvantages in face of a number 
of obstacles, not the least of which is the Arctic itself, and 
t he job to be done are discussed in Chapters III, V and VI. 
The author is , with this thesis, submitting an additional 
alternative for consideration: one which he terms the "Arctic 
Submarine" . It is of essentially the same size and has the same 
capabilities as the United States Navy submarines which, during 
the past two decades , have conclusively proved themselves capabl e 
of safe and reliable operations year round in the Ar ctic Ocean 
and its peri pheral seas . In presenting his proposal , the author 
first tra ces the development of two differ ent types of submarines : 
the mili t ary Arctic submarine , and the commercial submarine 
( Chapter s I thr ough III ). He proceeds to r eview: the present 
s tate of Arc t ic petrol eum explorat i on and devel opment (Chapter IV); 
the existent and proposed transport modes for this petroleum 
(Chapter V); and the obstacles which they must overcome (Chapter VI). 
He then presents his proposal for a new transport technology, 
which should begin with a prototype Arctic Transport Submarine, 
(Chapter VII); and concludes with an argument in its favor, 
(Chapters VIII and IX). 
CHAPTER I 
THE HISTORY OF ARCTIC AND TRANSPORT SUBMARINES 
THROUGH WORLD WAR II 
This chapter traces the origins and evolution of two types 
of submarines: the Arctic submarine, designed specifically for 
operations in ice-covered waters; and the undersea commerce or 
cargo vessel. It is a history of ideas and concepts as well as 
one of actual vessels, for technological capability often did 
not keep pace with vision. 
To World War I 
The basic concept of an Arctic submarine is well over three 
hundred years old. It appears to have originated with Bishop John 
Wilkins, founder and first secretary of the Royal Society of London. 
In 1648, he published Mathematical Magick: or the Wonders that may 
be Performed by Mechanical Geometry, and chapter V of Book II 
addresses "the possibility of framing an ark for submarine 
navigations". Among the "many advantages and conveniences of a 
submarine" cited by Wilkins were: "Tis safe, from the uncertainty 
of tides, and .the violence of tempests, which do never move the 
sea above five or six paces ••• and from ice and great frosts, 
which do much endanger the passages towards the pole" (quoted 
in Stefansson, 1931). 
More than two centuries elapsed, however, before attention 
again turned to the notion of submarine polar expeditions. 
Jules Verne's Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea, published 
in 1869, seems to have been a major stimulus f or this interest . 
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It most certainly inspired many early submarine pioneers, amongst 
them a Belgian engineer, Palmaerts, who in 1880 wished to "plunge 
into the three dimensions of the ocean and reach the pole by 
submarine" ( quoted in Wallace, 1981), and an American, Simon Lake. 
Lake made public his ideas for the utilization of a submarine for 
Arctic exploration in the New York Journal in early 1898. He soon 
followed this announcement with the preparation of designs for a 
submarine capable of navigating in ice-covered waters; and he 
applied for and received US Patent 638 342 for these designs 
(Lake, 1931). He later built the "Protector" which on January 20, 
1904, off the coast of Newport, Rhode Island, became the first 
submarine in history to ever navigate beneath and break through 
the ice (McLaren, 1981). 
At roughly the same time, D. I. Mendeleyev suggested a project 
to the Russian government for a submarine especially designed for 
navigation in the polar regions ( Gorlatov and Gakkel, ·, 1965); and in 1901, 
the Geographical Journal published a plan for reaching the North 
Pole by submarine. This plan had previously been presented by 
Professor Anschutz-Kampfe of Munich to the Vienna Geographical 
Society, and a "submarine boat" was being built at Wilhelmshaven. 
Anschutz-Kampfe's basic idea had , in turn, apparently originated 
some years earlier in Sweden. Although nothing further ~a~ ever 
heard of this project, Anschutz-Kampfe's estimation of the under-
ice environment, and of the conditions which might be encountered, 
was surprisingly accurate; and his plans to overcome the difficulties 
posed by Arctic under-ice navigation were well thought out too. 
It is interesting to note that Anschutz-Kampfe later developed 
the gyrocompass . He calculated that it could be used to overcome 
---
many of the major course determination difficulties of Arctic 
navigation (compasses, particularly magnetic ones, lose their 
directive accuracy as higher latitudes are approached). Later 
voyages proved his prediction. 
Meanwhile, Simon Lake was busy interesting the Russian 
Admiralty in the idea of under-ice navigation. He suggested to 
them that it would be easier and safer to send "large submarines 
across the Arctic and off the north coast of Russia and Siberia" 
than conventional routes to the Pacific (Lake, 1931). In 1905-
1906, Lake submitted his plans for a submarine especially suited 
for under-ice navigation to the Admiralty. The Russian Navy 
subsequently purchased six Lake submarines, several of which, 
such as the "Kefal", were successfully operated in ice-covered 
waters off Vladivostok and the Gulf of Finland in the years 
preceding World War I. 
World War I to World War II 
The German Navy were believed to have operated a few 
submarines in the ice of the northern Barents Sea off Spitsbergen 
during World War I (Mathiesen, 1954). They also began to use 
their submarines for supply purposes, thus laying the groundwork 
for the cargo submarine. By 1915 the British blockade of Germany 
had caused her to have a distinct shortage· of raw materials, 
especially nickel and rubber. The State Secretary of the Treasury 
thought of using U-boats to bring in these vital raw materials. 
A similar idea had occurred to German munition and mercantile 
firms such as Krupp and Lehmann; and a conglomerate, Deutsche 
Ozean-Reederie GmbH, was formed with the government. A contract 
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was awarded to the firm, Germania Werft, to build the first two 
of an 1800 ton "Merchant Cruiser" class of submarine, designated 
"U-200". These were, in reality, submarine freighters, and had 
a cargo capacity of approximately 740 tons. 
The first freighter, "Deutschland", was completed and ready 
for sea trials in May, 1916, only six months after the contract 
had been placed (see Figure 1). The second submarine, "Bremen", 
was ready shortly thereafter. Ozean-Reederies had been purchasing 
rubber and other materials throughout the US, and storing it in 
Baltimore. "Deutschland" made two voyages between Kiel, Baltimore , 
and Bremen in 1916 (Preston, 1975). On her first trip she carried 
163 tons of concentrated dye worth approximately $1.4 million; 
and on her return voyage, she carried 348 tons of rubber, 341 tons 
of nickel, and 93 tons of tin. The rubber alone was worth 
$17.5 million. That was several times the cost of building both 
submarines. "Bremen" sailed on her maiden voyage to .Norfolk, 
Virginia, at the end of 191 6, but was lost at sea somewhere off 
the Orkneys (Preston, 1975). After "Deutschland's" successful 
trips, six more cargo U-boats were ordered. Unfortunately, 
other war needs resulted in the reconversion of all of this 
class to the U-151 class, including the newly commissioned 
"Oldenberg" (Rossler, 1981). 
In America, Simon Lake submitted, in 1917, plans and models 
for two types of cargo carrying submarines to the US Shipping Board. 
These were for 11,000 and 13,000 tons --larger than _ the present 
Polaris ballistic missile submarines. These were designed so 
as to be capable of navigating across the Arctic from the Atlantic 
to the Pacific. His proposal to build a fleet of these was 
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seriously considered by two successive heads of the Shipping 
Board, but no action was taken (Lake, 1931). 
In Canada, the wartime Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, 
considered the use of submarines to aid and open commerce in 
northern areas such as Hudson Bay (Stefansson, 1931). 
In the years which followed World War I, interest in and 
support for Arctic submarine operations declined. Nevertheless, 
Admiral Peary did make brief mention of the possibility during 
a speech before the National Geographic Society in 1919 (Stefansson, 
1922). It was V. Stefansson who kept the idea alive in his 
discussions of the advantages of submarine trans-Arctic commerce, 
carried on in various international editions of his Northwest 
Course of Empire. But it was not until 1928, when Sir Hubert 
Wilkins returned from his successful flight across the Arctic, 
that serious attention was again given to the "Arctic submarine". 
Inspired by discussions held with Stefansson during a 1913-
1916 Arctic expedition, Wilkins was now convinced that the 
submarine was the best form of transportation for the Arctic. 
He began preparations for his 1931 expedition to cross the Arctic 
Ocean from the Atlantic to the Pacific via the North Pole, and 
was joined in -this venture by , among others, a former US submarine 
officer , S. Danenhower--and Simon Lake . Lake was particularly 
interested to see such a voyage made, as he foresaw that it would 
" open up to civilization a vast Arctic territory which only needs 
proper transportation facilities to make it one of the most 
pr oductive of the Earth ' s surface". He predicted that "If it 
were successful , in a fe w y ears thereafter , regular cargo - carry ing 
submarines of large s ize wou l d be t a king t he shorter Arctic route 
7 
during five or six months of the year" (Lake, 1931). 
Two of the main objectives of Wilkin's expedition are of 
particular interest: 
and: 
To demonstrate dramatically the fact that submersible 
vessels may be used for opening up and development of the 
Hudson Bay district and other northern areas. 
To demonstrate that submersible vessels may be used 
to transport at cheaper rates North American products--
through the Hudson Bay route or across the Arctic--to 
Europe, and so benefit primary producers and industrialists. 
(Wilkins, 1931) 
Wilkins obtained the Lake submarine "0-12 11 from the US Navy, 
and proceeded to reconvert and rename it. The 11Nau tilus" was 
175 feet long, and 550 tons, with an estimated capacity to cruise 
125 nautical miles, completely submerged, for up to three days 
(see Figure 2). His basic plan called for cruising submerged 
for sixteen out of every twenty-four hours, and then breaking 
or boring through ice to recharge batteries (Danenhower, 1931). 
Although Wilkins' expedition was well planned, it did not meet 
its goals. The submarine was old and inadequate; severe material 
failures in combination with damage which occurred in a dive 
under the ice and the lateness of the season meant that Wilkins 
had to turn back (New York Times, September 6, 8, 20 and 25, 1931). 
Nevertheless, public interest in Arctic submarines was aroused, 
and support gained. The concepts and techniques which were 
developed as a result of the expedition did much to ensure that 
submarines would one day be capable of operating throughout the 
Arctic (Lyon , 1963 ; McLaren , 1982) . 
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Developments during World War II 
Military needs in World War II stimulated the next significant 
advances in the gradually evolving technologies of both Arctic 
and cargo submarines. 
According to one authority, the Soviet submarine Sch-402 
operating in the Barents Sea was the first to surface through the 
ice, in 1942; and two submarines, the Sch-311 and the Sch-324, 
operated in the Gulf of Bothnia (Gorlatov and Gakkel', 1965). 
During the period 1941-1945, a significant number of 800 ton 
Type VII and 1100 ton Type IX German U-boats operated successfully 
in ice-covered waters around Spitsbergen, and off the Soviet 
coast from the eastern Barents Sea to the Laptev Sea. They rounded 
Novaya Zemlya and transited the Kara and Vilkitski Straits (U.S. Office 
of Naval Intelligence, 1951). They even conducted, from beneath 
the pack ice off northeast Greenland, an unsuccessful attack on 
a US Coast Guard cutter (U.S. Hydrographic Office, 1950). The 
conclusions of one of the most experienced German captains is 
interesting: 
A submarine is never helpless in the ice ••• because 
it can submerge, proceed under the ice, select an open 
area in the ice with the aid of its high-angle periscope, 
come to the surface, recharge the battery ••• and submerge 
again. It can dive and pass under all ice obstacles with 
the exception of the ice masses lying in shallow water. 
(quoted in U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 1951) 
Other observations, and needs cited by the ' German submariners, 
such as for under-ice acoustic detection equipment, resulted 
in the development of the basic requirements for a special Arctic 
submarine able to conduc.t " non-combat operations in the Arctic 
regions'' 00.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, 1951). Interestingly, 
10 
most of the requirements have now been fully incorporated into 
modern nuclear submarines . 
World War II saw the first major building and use of 
submarines for cargo. The Axis powers designed and built several 
different classes of submarine tankers and transports during 
this period . The German firm of A. G. Weser launched the 1700 ton 
I XD Class , of which u-180 and U- 195 , snorkel equipped , were used 
to transport fuel oil from Japan during 1944 . Several others 
of this class and of the Type IXC (U-178, u-188, u-843, U-861, 
U- 510 , and U-532)--some of whichhad- crutsing ranges of almost 
24 , 000 miles (Moore, 1976)--were employed to import vital stocks 
of tin, molybdenum and rubber during the last years of the war 
(Rossler, 1981) (see Figure 3). 
In response to a 1940 request from Admiral Donitz, the 
German Supreme Naval Commander, Deutsche Werke of Kiel built a 
d e dicated 1900 ton Type XIV submarine tanker . This "milch cow" 
class was capable of carrying 432 tons, or 3200 barrels, of fuel 
oil , and 45 tons of supplies (Rossler , 1981) . This was sufficient 
for reprovisioning four or five U-boats , thus enabling them to 
stay at sea twice as long as usual (Preston , 1975). Although 
success f u l , a l l ten of t h is class were combat losses (Moore , 
1976) (see Figure 4) . 
A German des i gn done specifically for transport , as opposed 
t o combat , was for a 2,500 , ton U- boat , des i gnated Type XIX . It 
was s ch e dul e d t o receive a n e w type of die sel pr opulsion system . 
As problems beset this new pr opulsion s yst em, the proposed 
submarin~was abandoned in favor of another, designated Type XX, 
which would t a ke the well tried Ty pe XIV pr opul s ion sys tem. 
Figure .2. 
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This was toward the end of 1942. A total of thirty of these 
Type XX submarines, each having a cargo load of 800 tons, was 
ordered during 1943, to be delivered at a rate of three per month 
from August, 1944 onwards. Also, . a 4,000 ton cargo submarine 
was proposed by an engineer named Kohrs, but it was never built 
(Rossler, 1981) (see Figure 5). 
In addition to designing and building new submarines for 
transport, the Germans reconverted ten Italian submarines, the 
"Aquila" project, for the same purpose. The Italians also used 
a considerable number of submarines for transport purposes, mainly 
to carry supplies to North Africa. In 1942, they began to build 
a special "Romolo" transport class. As well as submarine designs, 
the Germans designed containers to be submerged and towed behind 
U-boats. Some of these were built, and in 1944, tests of those 
with 90 and 300 ton capacities were successful. Orders were 
placed for a series of fifty. Events of the last year of the war 
and higher priorities prevented their completion (Rossler, 1981). 
The first U-boat to transport supplies from the Far East to 
Europe was a Japanese submarine cruiser, I-30, in 1942. In 1943 
and 1944, Japan sent four more of the many submarines they had 
converted to Europe, laden with raw materials. The Japanese also 
developed a special D-1 Class to resupply their Pacific Island 
garrisons (Preston, 1975). 
By the war's end, German designers such as Professor U. Gabler 
(now of IKL, Lubeck) had design studies in hand for the revolutionary 
long range , high speed submarine classes, Type XXID, XXIE, and XXIT. 
The prototypes of these actually got to sea during the last months 
of the war (Rossler, 1981) (see Figur e 6) . These submar ines were 
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Figure 4 Type XIV Submarine Tanker, 1943 
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not only capable of remaining submerged for several days, but 
also of transiting at snorkel depth at twelve knots for over 
10 , 000 miles (Moore, 1976). Thus the needs of World War II 
contributed greatly to the advance of submarine technology in 
general; and to experience and knowledge in regard to both 
Arctic and cargo submarines. 
CHAPTER II 
POST WORLD WAR II: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A "TRUE" 
ARCTIC SUBMARINE 
The years immediately following World War II saw an increased 
interest in the Arctic regions. They also saw the initiation of 
several projects by the US Navy which were to have profound 
implications for the ultimate development of a "true'' Arctic 
submarine. 
US Navy Arctic Operations with Conventional Submarines 
From 1946 to 1953, the US Navy conducted a series of 
operations in the Arctic, using conventionally powered submarines 
built during World War II . These operations were for scientific 
research, and to develop under-ice operating techniques and 
equipment. The USS 11 Boarfish11 (ss327) made the first excursion 
under pack ice in August, 1947, in the Chukchi Sea; and in 
September, 1948, the USS "Carp" (ss338) made a fifty-four mile 
penetration inside the Chukchi ice pack. During this time it 
developed techniques for making vertical ascents into the leads 
and lakes of open water which dotted the pack ice; and techniques 
for submerging- from these polynyas (Lyon, 1959). In the summers 
of 1952 and 1953 , the USS "Redfish" (ss395) conducted extensive 
oceanographic poj ects in the Beaufort Sea, ·as far as to Banks 
Island on one voyage. This completed the series of experiments 
with conventional submarines (McLaren, 1982) . 
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The First Nuclear Submarines 
During this same period, a US Navy group at Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, headed by Captain (now Admiral) H.G. Rickover made 
the decision to create the world's first nuclear power plant. 
Their goal was to achieve a "true" submarine, one that would be 
capable of cruising the world's ocean depths for months at a time, 
completely submerged. A special "Naval Reactors" organization 
was established in 1947 which had authority in both the Atomic 
Energy Commission and the US Navy. Under its auspices an extensive 
research and development effort was launched; and it produced, 
during the next six years, the design, construction and testing 
of a prototype submarine reactor plant, the STR Mark I. The 
testing, conducted in 1953, included a simulated non-stop, full-
power crossing of the Atlantic (Kintner, 1959). An STR Mark II 
was subsequently installed in a submarine especially built for it; 
and on January 17, 1955, the world's first "true" submarine, the 
USS "Nautilus", was underway (Anderson, 1959). 
Then came a series of Arctic expeditions with nuclear-powered 
submarines. In the summer of 1957, the USS "Nautilus" (SSN571), 
outfitted with the under-ice acoustic equipment of the "Redfish", 
departed for the first of three deep penetrations beneath the 
Arctic ice. These culminated with the first crossing of the 
Arctic Basin via the North Pole in August, 1958. "Nautilus" thus 
became the first "true 11 Arctic submarine, and ushered in a new 
era of submarine under-ice voyages for exploratory and research 
purposes. As Dr W. Lyon, senior scientist on this and all 
subsequent cruises, said: "The trans -Arc tic submarine, which five 
years ago was often called fantastic is now a demonstrable fact, 
and consequently the Arctic Ocean becomes an operating area for 
the submarine" (quoted in McWethy, 1958). 
Of the voyages which immediately followed, those by the 
USS "Skate" (SSN578) in 1958 and 1959 were particularly important. 
Not only did she reach the North Pole nine days after the 
"Nautilus"; she also carried navigational equipment which enabled 
her to maneuver at will in high latitudes while still maintaining 
an accurate position. Moreover, she conducted the first winter 
operation in the Arctic, and on March 17, 1959, became the first 
ship in history to surface--through the ice--at the North Pole 
(Calvert, 1961). 
In early 1960, the USS "Sargo" (SSN583) entered the Arctic 
Basin and successfully transited nine hundred miles across the 
shallow (water depths of forty to sixty meters) Bering-Chukchi 
Sea shelf. "Sargo" also proved the submarine's capability to 
safely navigate between deep ice ridges, in some cases extending 
nearly to the bottom, through the use of newly developed under-ice 
piloting sonar (Lyon, 1963). She spent a total of thirty-one days 
in the Arctic during February and March, 1960; and surfaced some 
sixteen times through thick ice, and in total darkness. She also 
conducted the · _first submerged transit survey of the Beaufort Sea 
entrance to the "Northwest Passage", the M'Clure Strait (McLaren, 
1982). Truly the "Sargo" on this journey de,monstrated the great 
capability of the nuclear submarine for Arctic use . 
During the summer of 1960, a fourth nuclear submarine, the 
USS 11 Seadragon" (SSN584), became the first submarine to pass 
beneath icebergs. Many of these exceeded several ~illion tons, 
and wer e of deep dr aft . She was also the first submar i ne to 
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complete the classic "Northwest Passage", from east to west, by 
way of the Parry Chennel. "Seadragon's" under-ice navigation 
and piloting capabilities enabled her to locate and survey a 
safe all-season deep water passage through the Barrow Strait 
(Steele, 1962). 
This era came to a dramatic conclusion in the summer of 1962 
when the USS "Skate", coming from the Atlantic by way of the 
Nares Strait and the Lincoln Sea (the first submarine transit 
of these waters), rendezvoused with the USS "Seadragon", which 
had come from the Pacific, at the North Pole (Lyon, 1963). 
On her return, the "Skate" made the first transit of the "Northwest 
Passage", west to east, by way of the Parry Channel (McLaren, 1982). 
During the period from 1957 to 1962, United States' nuclear 
submarines had travelled over fifty thousand kilometers under 
the Arctic ice (Sater, 1969). By 1963, as Dr W. Lyon (1963) 
stated: "The Arctic Ocean has become the private s~a of the 
submariner who is free to move in any direction and at any speed 
under the ice covering the sea 
" 
The "Sturgeon" Class of Nuclear Submarine 
In 1963, construction began on a new "Sturgeon" Class of 
nuclear attac~ submarine. Thirty-seven were to be built, and all 
were to have the capability of year round Arctic operation. 
Here are the special features which they possess: 
The top of the sail and rudder is strengthened (with 
HY 80 steel), the masts have special ice caps, and sail 
planes can be r otated for surfacing through ice. The 
class also possesses a recessed secondary propulsion 
motor that can be lowered and used for precise maneuvering . 
The general characteristic of the under-ice sonar can be 
seen from the accompanying figure (see Figure 7). In a 
typical surfacing evolution, a polynya of the requisite 
Figure Z. 
F AIRW ATER PLANES 
ROTATE TO 110' RISE 
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"Sturgeon" Class Special Under-Ice Operating Features 
This schematic shows the characteristics of under-ice sonar. The iceberg detector continuously scans 
ahead of the submarine for icebergs or deep projections of ice. The cones (1 through 7) are acoustic 
projectors used to measure ice thickness above the main deck prior to surfacing. The profiler is used 
for precise measurement of ice thickness overhead during transit. The two cones pointing downward 
are the fathometers. 
(after McLaren , 1981 ) 
Figure 8 Diving and Surfacing in the Arctic 
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/n a typical surfacing evolution in a suitable polyn_1•a, the submarine is m aneuvered inro a hovering 
position beneath its center; ·once the top sounders indicate open water or appropriately thin ice 
overhead, a venical ascent is commenced inco the pol_vnya. 
( a ft er McLar en , 1981) 
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length is located, course is reversed, depth is decreased , 
and the submarine is maneuvered into a hovering position 
beneath its center. The secondary propulsion motor is 
used to make last-minute adjustments to ensure avoidance 
of large blocks of ice overhead. Once the sounders 
indicate "all clear", or indicate ice sufficiently thin 
overhead, a vertical ascent is commenced into the 
polynya (see Figure 8). 
(McLaren, 1981) 
The first of these submarines to test its Arctic capabilities 
was the USS "Queenfish" (SSN652). She departed for the Davis 
Strait and Baffin Bay in January, 1967, and spent a week in 
ice-covered, iceberg-infested waters. The shakedown cruise of 
this new class of submarine concluded with a successful surfacing 
through ice. 
The voyages which followed the 1967 "Queenfish" cruise were 
made by submarines with virtually identical operational 
characteristics and scientific research capabilities . The princi~al 
cruises conducted between 1967 and 1981 are: 
p 
Date ~ubmarine 
Feb USS "Queenfish" 
1967 
Apr-May USS "Whale" 
1969 USS "Sa.rgo" 
Aug 
1970 
USS "Queenfish" 
Nov USS "Hammerhead" 
1970 
Mar HMS "Dreadnought" 
1971 
Feb-Mar USS "Trepang" 
1971 
Mar-Apr USS "Hawkbill" 
1972 
Mar USS "Bluefish" 
1975 
Mar USS "Gurnard" 
1976 
Sep 
1976 
HMS "Sovereign" 
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Area 
Baffin Bay 
Arctic Basin 
Nares Strait, 
Arctic Basin 
Arctic Basin 
North Pole 
Denmark Strait, 
Greenland Sea 
Northern 
Bering Sea 
Greenland Sea, 
Arctic Basin 
Arctic Basin 
Beaufort Sea 
Arctic Basin 
Greenland Sea 
Mar 
1977 
USS "Flying Fish" Greenland Sea 
Arctic Basin 
Oct 
1978 
Mar 
1979 
Nov 
1981 
USS "Pintado" Arctic Basin, 
Kara Sea 
USS "Archerfish" Baffin Bay, 
Nares Strait 
USS "Silversides" Greenland Sea 
Arctic Basin 
Major Accomplishments 
First single-screw 
nuclear submarine 
operations in and 
under the ice 
Surfacing through 
thick ice 
Extensive shallow 
water operations using 
satellite navigation 
First autumn cruise 
First UK Arctic 
operation 
* 
Shallow water 
operations 
* 
Extensive shallow 
water operations _ 
* 
* 
* 
The 100th nuclear 
submarine 
* Because of secur i ty constraints, details on these expeditions 
cannot be given. 
(After McLaren, 1982) 
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It is interesting to note that the one hundredth nuclear 
submarine, the USS "Silversides", with a cruising range of 
400,000 miles, could travel six times the distance of the first 
nuclear submarine, the USS "Nautilus" (General Dynamics, 1970). 
Without a doubt, the voyages from 1967 to 1981 proved that nuclear 
submarines are capable of operating successfully throughout the 
Arctic Basin and its peripheral seas, and in the Canadian 
archipelago year round, and over extensive periods. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORT SUBMARINE CONCEPTS 
FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II 
Unlike the dramatic progress that was made in regard to 
"Arctic" submarines after World War II, the development of tanker 
or cargo submarines for commercial purposes has been relatively 
slow. Briefly, it would seem that the military, which was the 
impetus and funding behind the "Arctic" submarine and associated 
research, was not interested in submarines for transport purposes; 
private industry, which occasionally may have been interested, 
did not see how a commercial submarine could offer cost-effective 
transport, and therefore did not invest in pursuing their development. 
Nevertheless, there have been some interesting proposals and 
designs, and they are the subject of this chapter. 
Submarine Tanker Concepts: Proposals and Responses 
The polar cruises of the nuclear submarines discussed in 
the last chapter, particularly the cruises of the USS "Nautilus" 
and the USS "Skate", triggered speculations about the possibilities 
of submarine use for commercial purposes . The successful completion 
of a 36,000 mile, eighty-three day, completely submerged circum-
navigation of fhe world by the USS " Triton'' (SSN586) provided 
further stimulation. This was in 1960, and the 442 foot long 
"Triton" was the world's largest nuclear submarine (General 
Dynamics, 1970). Over a dozen serious proposals were made for 
commercial submarines between 1957 and 1960 (Crewe and Hardy, 1962). 
One of the earliest and most complete proposals was a 
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detajled investigation and economic analysis of a range of 
transport submarine designs. It was done in 1958 and 1959 for 
Mitchell Engineering Ltd by Saunders-Roe , a division of Westland 
Aircraft Company. The purpose was to design submarines especially 
for the transport of iron ore from the Diana Bay region , northern 
Quebec, to Great Britain year round, irrespective of ice conditions. 
Proposed capacities ranged from 15,000 to 60,500 deadweight tons. 
The study ultimately focussed on plans for a 50,000 ton nuclear 
submarine cargo vessel capable of carrying 28,000 tons of 
pelletized iron ore. It concluded that such a vessel would be 
quite feasible using existing materials and knowledge; and that 
if operated year round on the route considered, it would be 
economically justified ( Crewe· and Hardy, 1962) ( see Figure 9). 
Despite this promising assessment, apparently nothing was 
done toward further development . Had the proposed vessel been 
built , it probably would have been eminently suitable for meeting 
the transportation r equirements of Canada ' s new Polaris mine on 
Little Cornwallis Island, just off the "Northwest Passage" in 
the Arctic Islands (Malcolm, 1982) . 
In 1958 and again in 1962 , the United States Maritime 
Administration selected General Dynamics to conduct feasibility 
s t u d ies on a s u bmar ine tank e r concept. Both times , the conclus ion 
was that the concept was a sound one ; but both times, no further 
s t eps were taken (Truitt , 1970) . 
In 1970 , follow i ng the Pr udhoe Bay d i scoverie s , General 
Dynamics pr o posed to fi v e maj or o i l compan i es " t o build a flee t 
of [sixteen nuclear powered ] super su bmarine tankers" that would 
transport the rich deposits on the North Slope to r e fineri e s 
AUXILIARY 
AND TURBO 
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Figure 2. General Arrangement Submarine Cargo Vessel, 1958 
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in the continental United States. Each submarine was to be 
900 feet long, with beams of 140 feet and a hull depth of 85 feet; 
they would be capable of carrying 170,000 tons, or 1,275,000 barrels, 
of oil, and travel beneath the sea and ice at speeds up to eighteen 
knots (Truitt, 1970). 
Although General Dynamics felt their studies proved that a 
submarine tanker could transport oil to United States East Coast 
ports--something that had not been achieved despite need--at 
lower cost than other systems proposed, such as pipelines and 
icebreaker tankers, the oil companies said "No". They opted 
instead for the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System. 
That decision was probably made with some of the same 
considerations in mind which were cited by the United States 
Department of Interior in its statement concerning marine 
transportation alternatives. In its "Final Environmental Statement" 
(1972) made in response to the application of Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Company to "Design, construct, operate, and maintain a 
Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System", the U.S. Department of Interior noted! 
1. the technical problems posed by having to develop a tanker 
loading terminal in shallow coastal waters suitable for 
more than seasonal operation. 
2. that even experimental subsurface tankers had not yet 
been developed, and safe passages to either coast were 
not well defined. 
3. that large submarine tankers would be severely limited 
in both lateral and vertical movements from Point Barrow 
to the Pribilof Islands, and among the Arctic Islands. 
4. concern about past transport tanker oil pollution 
problems, and concern with the potential impact of 
similar casualties on a not-well - understood Arctic 
marine environment. 
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In 1973, Canada announced an intention to develop within 
five years an expertise and capability for operating in and below 
ice-covered waters such that it would elicit international acclaim . 
The Minister of Transport commissioned a study to examine and 
make recommendations "as to the suitability, applicability, and 
relevant economics of marine subsurface and submarine vessels 
for the transport of oil, gas, and minerals from the Canadian 
Ar ctic • • • to world markets" (Courtney, 1977). 
In 1974, alarmed by the first Arab oil embargo which had 
caused crude oil prices to increase dramatically, from approximately 
%}.00 to %12.00 per barrel (British Petroleum, 1977), the United 
States Department of Commerce commissioned a study to explore the 
feasibility of an Arctic submarine transportation system to deliver 
oil directly to the East Coast (Werner, 1981). The study was 
conducted under the auspices of the United States Maritime 
Administration, which acts as a "ship broker" for the - government 
and generally oversees the operation of the United States Merchant 
Marine. . It was conducted by an industry team composed of Newport 
News Shipbuilders, Westinghouse Electrical Company, Bechtel, Inc., 
and Mobile Shipping and Transport Company. 
The study _developed designs for nuclear submarine tanker s, 
ranging in size from 100,000 to 900,000 tons submerged displacement . 
It settled upon a 1,000 foot long , rectangular hull design which 
had a displacement of 424 , 512 tons . It could carry a cargo of 
2 ,1 03, OOO barrels of API 27 to API 37 oil, at "service speeds" 
o f t wenty knots (Figur e 10) . 
The study also addr essed in some detail the system suitability 
questions raised previous ly by the u .S. Department of I nterior. 
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It concluded "that submarine tanker systems are technically 
feasible, offer an attractive rate of return, and compare favorably 
with other delivery systems in terms of transportation costs" 
(Taylor and Montgomery, 1977) . However, as in the case of General 
Dynamics' scheme, the petroleum industry gave no positive reply to 
this -- the first serious attempt by the United States government to 
stimulate development of an Arctic submarine transport system. 
General Dynamics' Submarine Super-Tanker 
The most recent conceptual design to be generally publicized 
is by General Dynamics for an Arctic Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) 
submarine super-tanker. The tanker transport system was first 
proposed publicly at a technical conference in Germany in early 
October, 1981 (Lippman, 1981). 
This proposal, which explores the technical and economic 
feasibility of submarine tankers and puts forth a design concept 
for one, draws heavily upon General Dynamics' previous work in 
this area. Both nuclear and conventional propulsion versions were 
adapted from earlier submarine tanker designs; General Dynamics 
states that they have been 11 hydrodynamically verified" in extensive 
engineering studies of Arctic cargo submarine systems (Veliotis 
and Reitz, 1981a). 
There are two versions: one utilizing a nuclear propulsion system; 
the other, a conventional one. Both versions would have a minimum 
cargo capacity of 125,000 cubic meters, or thirty-seven million 
gallons, of LNG~ chilled to minus 260° Fahrenheit (Newsweek, 1981). 
This is to be carried in six 341 foot long, 57 .1 foot diameter, 
990 nickel-steel cargo tanks (Veliotis and Reitz , 1981a) . The 
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proposed tankers are very large--almost five times as long as 
"Trident", which is itself very large by submarine standards. 
General Dynamics' proposal calls for a fleet of fourteen to 
seventeen of these super-tankers; or perhaps as many as twenty-
eight (Robb, 1982). Below is a table showing the characteristics 
of the two versions. Also, see Figure 11. 
CHARACTERISTIC 
Propulsion 
Length Overall 
Beam 
Depth 
Shaft Horsepower 
Submerged Displacement 
Cargo Capacity 
Estimated Cost 
Speed 
VERSION I 
methane gas-fired 
steam 
1470 feet 
228 feet 
92 feet 
50,000 (25,000 
each shaft) 
860,649 metric tons 
59,695 metric tons 
$700, OOO, OOO 
12 kts 
VERSION II 
nuclear 
1270 feet 
same 
same 
75,000 (37,500 
each shaft) 
713,122 metric tons 
same 
$725,000,000 
15 kts 
(after Veliotis and Reitz, 1981a) 
The super-tankers are to carry LNG from submerged terminals 
located forty miles offshore in the Beaufort Sea, to ice-free 
Canadian or European ports (Lippman, 1981) • . General Dynamics 
hopes the proposal will be considered a more attractive alternative 
for supplying the United States' market from the Beaufort Sea 
than the Arctic Pilot Project (see Chapter V, p.56) which Petro-
Canada is proposing. It is also seen as an alternative to a 
4,800 mile, f43 billion Alaska Highway Pipeline planned from 
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Figure 11 ' General Dynamics' Submarine Super-Tanker, 1981 
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Prudhoe Bay through Canada to terminals in both San Francisco 
and Chicago. The General Dynamics proposal was, apparently with 
the support of the United States government, also directed to 
the West German government and ship building industry (Huxley, 1981; 
Hargreaves, 1981); it was presented as an alternative .to a Siberian 
Pipeline, which might bring Russian natural gas to West Germany 
and to other European countries (Huxley, 1981). Since then, 
however, West Germany, France, and Italy have selected the 
Siberian pipeline plan (Norman, 1981; Dodsworth, 1981; Buxton, 1982). 
General Dynamics estimates that "a submarine tanker would 
be an economically viable alternative to surface icebreaking 
tankers and pipeline systems through its ability to deliver a 
constant cargo volume at uniform, predictable schedule intervals 
year round, :r-egardless of surface ice and weather conditions" 
(Veliotis and Reitz, 1981a). General Dynamics also claims that submarine 
tankers are the most acceptable answer environmentaJly because 
they do not require any inland construction, nor would they 
break-up the ice packs along shipping routes (Huxley, 1981). 
In testimony to a Congressional subcommittee, General Dynamics 
claimed that "a fleet of submarines could be built for billions 
less [than the proposed Alaska natural gas pipeline]" (Kronholm, 
1981) . 
Whether or not General Dynamics' proposal meets the same fate 
as all previous proposals for submarine tankers remains to be seen. 
CHAPTER IV 
PETROLEUM RESOURCES IN THE NORTH AMERICAN ARCTIC 
The difficulties that accompany remote access and severe 
physical conditions such as dark periods , extreme cold , pervasive 
permafrost, and heavy concentrations of sea ice and snow, have 
until recently deterred exploration for exploitable oil and gas 
deposits in the North American Arctic. The necessity of conducting 
military operations in the Arctic during World War II resulted not 
only in increased awareness of the potential economic importance of 
the northern regions of Canada, Alaska, and Greenland, but also 
in major developments in technology necessary for living and 
operating in these areas. Because of this progress, and because 
of the increased need to cut down dependence on foreign oil sources , 
the United States and Canada have in the past decade become 
increasingly active in their exploration and development of 
Arctic petroleum resources. 
This chapter will examine the proven and potential petroleum 
resources in only those areas of the North American Arctic where 
submarine transport is a desirable , if not absolutely essential 
feature of their developmental technology. They are the same 
ar eas where Uni ted States' nuclear submarines have already proven 
their capability to operate year round . 
ALASKA 
By the end of the last decade , Alaskan offshore petroleum 
pr ospec ts were looking even more promising than those that had 
been discove r ed on land (CIA Pol ar Regions Atlas , 1978) . 
t l 
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United States government studies conducted in 1977 indicated that 
as much as one-third of the total undiscovered petroleum reserves 
in the United States may exist on the continental shelf of Alaska 
(Lindburgh and Provoise, 1977). US Federal Leases have already 
been purchased for the Alaskan portions of the Beaufort Sea inner 
continental shelf (Turner, 1979); companies such as Exxon and 
British ~etroleum have exploratory drilling programs in progress 
(Gamble, 1979). British Petroleum, for example, drilled several 
exploratory wells from offshore islands in the Beaufort Sea, and 
discovered oil from their first well, Challenge Island. Two more 
wells were drilled in 1981 to help determine the best method for 
developing earlier discoveries (British Petroleum, 1981). 
Amco Production Company is drilling at "No Name" Island; Chevron, 
at Jeanette Island; and SOHIO, at Alaska Island H 1 (Alaska 
Construction and Oil, April, 1982). 
Recent seismic surveys west of Alaska in the Bering and 
Chukchi Seas have revealed several basins which may contain large 
volumes of oil. Although not a single exploratory well has been 
drilled as yet to confirm their potential, it is estimated that 
the Navarin Basin in the Bering Sea could contain as many as 
seven billion barrels of oil. The surveys have also revealed 
potential oil~bearing basins in the Chukchi Sea (O'Toole, 1980). 
The Bureau of Land Management's present leasing plan calls for 
opening the Navarin basin for lease in late 1984, and the Chukchi 
Sea in 1985 (Alaska Industry, October, 1979). 
Since the lal3t 1940s, the Beaufort Sea off Alaska, and the 
I 
Bering and Chukchi Seas have all been extensively explored by 
American diesel and nuclear submarines . United States Navy nuclear 
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submarines have time . and again proven the feasibility of access 
and year round operations in both the shallow, to depths of 
forty meters, and deep portions of these seas with both confidence 
and safety (McLaren, 1982). 
CANADA 
Reserves of potentially exploitable oil and gas are to be 
found in seven areas of the Canadian Arctic. Three areas, the 
Beaufort Sea, the Arctic Islands, and Lancaster Sound/Baffin Bay, 
are particularly suitable for submarine transport. Nearly fifty 
per cent of Canada's total petroleum reserves are estimated to 
be in the Arctic and more than half of Canada's Arctic petroleum 
resources lie offshore (Canadian Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, 1980; ~' 1981). The Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee estimates the offshore reserves to be between sixty 
and seventy billion barrels (Arctic Seas Bulletin, July, 1979). 
Each of the areas possess.es unique features and natural 
conditions which require tailor-made petroleum exploration, 
production, and transportation systems. They in turn require 
technology which differs from conventional techniques(~, 1981). 
The Beaufort Sea 
The ice conditions of the Beaufort Sea make it one of the 
most hazardous of Arctic environments for offshore drilling. 
Much of the Sea is covered by the ?olar pack circulating slowly 
around the Polar Basin . In addition, pressure ridges created by 
wind and ocean currents frequently occur along with large ice 
fragments. Moreover, permafrost may be widespread in the bottom 
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sediments of the shallow continental shelf (Pimlott et al, 1976; 
Wadhams, 1981b) . These conditions have made exploration more 
difficult, but they have not deterred it. The "whale pasture", 
as the Beaufort Sea has been called (Foster, 1980), is being 
increasingly probed for the resources it holds . The Beaufort Sea 
Project studies, 1975 and 1976, substantially increased knowledge 
on matters vital to petroleum exploration, and resulted in 
development of ice monitoring and movement prediction techniques 
(Pallister, 1981). 
In 1961 the Canadian government decided t--0 open parts of 
the Arctic to petroleum exploration; the Beaufort Sea was one of 
the areas opened. The major oil companies acquired Federal 
exploration permits in all areas, but there was little active 
interest in the Beaufort Sea because it was covered with ice for 
eight months of the year. The Prudhoe Bay discovery in 1968, 
however, quickly caused relative apathy to change to interest. 
The Mackenzie Delta, 600 miles east of Prudhoe Bay and south of 
the Beaufort Sea, immediately assumed a new importance (Pimlott, 
1976). Exploration and discovery of petroleum beneath the 
Mackenzie Delta brought encouraging but not spectacular finds. 
Instead, geophysical surveys began indicating that the offshore 
Beaufort Sea of-fered more promise of finding large hydrocarbon 
deposits. Thus it became the first offshore area in the Arctic 
to attract the oil industry (Pimlott et al. ; 1976). 
By 1972, geophysical and seismic prospects looked sufficiently 
promising for the oil companies to start exploratory drilling. 
Esso Resources Canada Ltd . (Imperial Oil Ltd.) began building 
the first of sixteen artificial islands from which to drill. 
Called Immersk, it was located two kilometers offshore in three 
meters of water (Oilweek, January 18, 1982). The first Beaufort 
Sea oil and gas discovery made offshore was at another well, 
ADGO (Pimlott et al, 1976). Subsequently, Esso discoveries were 
made at Nektoralok, Ukalerk, and at their largest well, Issungnak. 
Issungnak was only recently completed and is thirty-two kilometers 
offshore in nineteen meters of water (Imperial Oil, 1982). A 
recent step-out well, Issungnak 2061, recorded a flow of 6,456 
barrels per day (Oilweek, December 14, 1981). Esso plans to 
continue constructing and exploring from artificial islands 
(APOA, May, 1981), and estimates that 6.3 billion barrels of oil 
lie beneath the Beaufort Sea (Oilweek, April 5, 1982). See 
Figure 12 for site locations. 
Dome Petroleum started offshore drilling using ice-reinforced 
drill-ships in 1976; they struck gas in three wells during the 
1977 drilling season. One well tested at 480,000 cubic meters 
of gas per day and an oil test flow from another offshore well 
was over 1,000 barrels per day (Miles and Wright, 1978). 
By 1978 , proved reserves discovered as a result of the 
combined companies' activities totalled some 1.5 billion barrels 
of oil and 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas . These 
figures are for the shallow water s of the Beaufort Sea , in 
combination wi th the Mackenzie Delta . Following these shallow 
water successes , exploratory drilling began to examine the even 
mo r e promising geological structures i n the deeper offshore waters 
despite opposition f r om environmental groups (CIA Polar Regions 
At l as , 1978 ). 
By the end of 1978 , Dome Petroleum had c ompl e ted two and 
I 
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Figure .12- Beaufort Sea Exploration Well Locations 
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started four more exploratory wells, this time in water from 
twenty-five to sixty-seven meters (AFOA, July, 1979). They also 
began to develop new drill-ship designs with features which would 
permit drilling to continue over a substantially longer season 
in the Beaufort Sea, and year round in the Arctic Islands (AFOA, 
November, 1978). In September, 1979, one of the wells, Koponoar 
M-13 in fifty-eight meters of water, hit what proved to be a major 
oil find. Consultants estimated that production on a sustained 
basis could exceed 12,000 barrels per day. Dome considered this 
to be commercially significant, and began drilling a step-out 
well, Koponoar I-44. Tests were conducted on three other wells--
Tarsuit, Nerlerk, and Ukalerk, with encouraging results and 
Ukalerk indicated a flow of 85,000 cubic meters of natural gas 
per day (AFOA, November, 1979). 
Dome then began constructing more permanent and durable 
caisson reinforced artificial islands from which to conduct 
exploratory and, eventually, production drilling. The first 
of these, Tarsiut N-44, was completed in twenty-three meters of 
water in 1981 (AFOA, May, 1981). 
In late 1981, Dome reported quite promising results from 
the wells at Koponoar and Koakoak. Koponoar, in sixty to sixty-
five meters of water, yielded 1,670 barrels of oil per day , with 
an estimated daily output of 5,000 to 10,000 barrels under normal 
operating conditions. The potential total recovery was calculated 
to be 1.8 to 4.5 billion barrels. Koakoak, in forty to forty -
eight meters of water, yielded 3,330 barrels per day . Estimates 
put the flow at 5,000 barrels per day under normal operating 
conditions , and the total at 2 to 5 billion recoverable barrels . 
·, 
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These are comparable to many Arab oil fields, and are of 
unquestionable commercial potential. Dome estimates that a 
threshold of 400 million barrels of recoverable oil are required 
for commercial production(~, D~cember, 1981). During 1982, 
the structures beneath both wells will be evaluated fully by 
Dome's four drilling ships, with test and delineation wells 
(Oilweek, December 14, 1981; ~, spring/summer, 1982). 
Dome also ex pects to complete three other wells during 1982 : 
Irkaluk B-35, Kenaloak J-94, and Orviruk P-30 (Oilweek, April 12, 
1982) . The company believes that the Beaufort Sea holds reserves 
of between 30 and 40 billion barrels of oil (Meisler, 1979); 
and production could exceed 1.2 million barrels per day by 1990 
(Harrison, 1979). 
Gulf has participated in eleven exploratory wells in the 
Beaufort Sea, and as a partner of Essa and Dome has shared in 
the recent discoveries at Issungnak, Koponoar, Koakoak, and 
Tarsiut (APOA, December, 1981) . Drilling activity in the deeper 
waters of the Beaufort Sea moved to a year round operation when 
Gulf began spudding a step-out well at Tarsiut in December , 1981 . 
Gulf also drilled a wildcat well at Uviluk in 1982 from an 
artificial island constructed in the deepest water yet, thirty-
one meters (Oilweek, February 22, 1982 ). Gulf is presently 
having two new drilling systems built for exploring the deeper 
waters of the Beaufort Sea in 1983 or 1984: a floating conical 
dr i lling unit , and a mobile Arctic caisson which will rest on a 
dredged subsurface and can operate year round in water depths of 
twenty-one to thirty-six meters (APOA , September and December , 1981). 
Gulf, like Dome, believes that the Beaufort Sea will in time 
Ill , 
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become one of the world's major petroleum producing areas . 
It has estimated reserves of 1.5 trillion cubic meters of gas, 
and 6 billion barrels of oil (AFOA, May, 1981). 
All three companies have recently (1981) submitted to the 
government a development plan with a supporting environmental 
impact statement (EIS) which projects their activities to the 
year 2000. The plan, which has been referred to a Federal 
Environmental Assessment and Review Panel (EARP), covers activities 
leading up to the full-scale production and transportation of 
offshore gas and oil from the Beaufort Sea. Three phases are 
outlined as follows: 
Phase 
1. Pre-Production 
(1982-1985) 
Major Elements 
39 additional offshore exploration and 
delineation wells, drilled from artificiaL 
islands in shallow waters 
drill-ship and other deep water drilling 
systems for year round exploration and 
delineation 
construction of production islands, platforms, 
facilities, and systems 
development of transport system 
2. Early Production 40 exploration and delineation wells 
(1986-1990) 
160 offshore production wells, potentially 
producing up to 500,000 barrels per day 
emphasis on oil production and transportation 
possibly, build 5 more ·exploration, and 5 more 
production islands 
3. Final Development 80-100 exploration and delineation wells 
(1991-2000) 
400 production wells, from 8 systems , fixed 
and mobile, producing up to 1,250,000 barrels 
per day . 
(~, December, 1981) 
I 
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The group anticipates that full-scale natural gas production in 
the Beaufort Sea will be achieved by 1992. 
The capability of submarines to operate in both the deep 
and shallow portions of the Beaufqrt Sea has been proven by the 
United States Navy during the past twenty-two years. As stated 
earlier, the USS 11 Redfish" operated there in the early 1950s; 
the USS "Bargo" explored portions during the winter of 1960; 
the USS "Seadragon" explored other portions during the summers 
of 1960 and 1962; and in the summer of 1976, the USS "Gurnard" 
spent almost a month operating in the shallower portions 
(McLaren , 1982). 
The Arctic Islands 
The world's most northerly wells at present have been drilled 
in the Canadian Archipelago. By 1973, Panarctic discovered four 
significant gas fields: Drake Point, Recla, Thor, and Kristoffer, 
which are estimate~ to contain between .3 and . 4 trillion cubic · 
meters of gas ( Miles and Wright, 1978). -The first discovery was 
on Thor Island in 1972 (Panarctic Oils, etc., 1981a) . . Followed 
by promising discoveries at 43° API crude oil at Bent Horn, 
Cameron Island, in April 1974 (Panarctic Oils, 1981b). By 
October 1975, Panarctic obtained a flow of 3 , 000 barrels per day 
of high grade crude oil from the field (Miles and Wright, 1978). 
Follow-on step-out wells drilled in 1975 and 1976 resulted in 
estimated r,eserves of approximately 300 million barrels , of which 
100 million are considered_ proved (Miles and Wright, 1978). 
During 1979 and 1980, Panarctic made additional offshore discoveries 
of oil and gas from wells at Whitefish, to the southwest of 
II! 
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Lougheed Island and at Char, south of Ellef Ringnes Island 
(Panarctic, 1981b). In 1981, Panarctic made three major new 
' 
discoveries with wells drilled from offshore ice platforms. 
These were: Skate B-80 well, located in the northern MacLean Strait 
eighteen kilometers northeast of Lougheed Island. Oil and gas 
were discovered at MacLean I-72 well, located in the MacLean 
Strait twenty-seven kilometers east of Lougheed Island, with 
a flow of 775 barrels a day of crude oil, and an estimated reserve 
of up to 280 million barrels. Oil and gas were also discovered 
at Cisco B-66, sixteen kilometers west of Lougheed. Island. It is 
a major find with a flow of nearly 4,000 barrels per day of oil, 
and an estimated reserve of 1 billion barrels of oil (Panarctic 
Oil, 198ab; Oilweek, December 14, 1981, and January 18, 1982). 
As of 1981, a total of eleven gas fields have been discovered 
in the Arctic Islands (Panarctic Oil, 1981a). Over 0.3 trillion 
cubic meters of natural gas were found in the Melville Island area. 
Moreover, Panarctic expects their Drank field, located off the 
northern Sabine Peninsula of Melville Island, to ultimately 
yield as much as 2.8 trillion cubic meters of gas (Urquahart, 
1982b); that is equal to one half of the United States proved 
gas reserves. It is interesting to note that Drake F-76, 
completed in 1978, was the world's fi;st under-ice well. It 
subsequently became the first Arctic subsea producing well in 
forty-five meters of water. The Drake discoveries demonstrate 
how extensive gas reserves offshore as distant as twenty-four 
kilcmeters and in 457 meters of water could be developed . 
Having concluded that the best potential lies in deeper 
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waters yet, Panarctic has expanded its program of research and 
exploration in the Arctic Islands. During 1982, it is drilling 
from four ice platforms, and expects to have three · more in operation 
by 1983. Additionally, Panarctic is arranging for a deep drilling 
rig, capacity to 7000 meters, to be delivered during 1982 (AFOA, 
December, 1981). See Figure 13. C. Hetherington, Panarctic' s 
president, is of the opinion that Canada may be producing oil as 
well as gas from the Arctic Islands by the 1990's, before production 
starts in either the Beaufort Sea or the Hibernian (off Newfoundland) 
fields (Urquahart, 1982b). 
Because of relatively stable ice conditions and deep water 
approaches, the areas just discussed should be particularly 
amenable to the pickup and transport of petroleum by submarine. 
The water depths and physical conditions permit easy access for 
submarine transports via the following deep water passages: 
Prince Gustaf Adolf Sea, Byam Channel, Austin Channel, and 
Byam Martin Channel . 
Lancaster Sound/Baffin Bay 
The area is the eastern deep water entrance to the "Northwest 
Passage". The dynamic sea conditions--icebergs, moving pack ice 
and rapid surface currents--of Lancaster Sound and northern Baffin 
BAy are in sharp contrast to the calmer, relatively ice-locked 
waters of the Arctic Islands (Pallister, 1980). 
Large scale seismic surveys , conducted since the late 1960 1 s , 
have revealed some fifty promising geological structures . They 
are estimated to contain eight per cent of Canada's total potential 
oil and gas reserves . Oil and gas permits have been awarded 
I 
11 
,--._ 
Ill 
H, 
c+ 
CD 
.., 
'"CJ § 
Ill 
rj 
() 
c+ 
~-
~ 
-' 
\.0 
(X) 
-' 
'-" 
120° 112° f I eo• 
CANADIAN AR CTIC ISLANDS 
1980/81 WI NTER DRILLI NG 
LOCATIONS 
Mf1...v11...1...f 
" 20 
--·--
---
----
0 10 20 
~ 
~
>-rj 
I-' · 
q 
s:; 
rj 
CD 
~ 
)> 
rj 
() 
c+ 
I-'· 
() 
H 
[/] 
I-' 
=• § 
\ 
ee· 
/\ ( 
80 100 Mi lo 
~ 
s 
p.. 
[/] 
'"CJ 
CD 
c+ 
rj 
0 
I-' 
CD 
s:; 
8 
t::J 
I-' · 
[/] 
() 
0 
< (1) 
.., 
«:j 
en 
I-' · 
c+ 
Cl) 
[/] 
+ 
0\ 
t 
for areas within Lancaster Sound and the approval to start drilling 
has not yet been given by the Department of Indian and Northern 
Affairs. 
In 1974, Norland Petroleum Ltd., proposed to drill an 
exploratory well on the Dundas structure, one of the largest , 
located in 770 meters of water. The proposal was referred to 
the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office, and the 
Lancaster Sound EARP Panel was set up to determine the proposal's 
acceptability. The proposal was denied in 1979 and a recommen-
dation was made that the government issue a statement on the most 
appropriate use of Lancaster Sound. An examination of the entire 
northwest sea route including preliminary papers and public 
hearings was conducted by the Canadian government, and it is 
expected to release a final " Green Paper" soon (Canadian Arctic 
Resources Committ.ee, 1979b; Canada Indian and Northern Affairs, 
1982). In the meantime, Petroleum Canada Exploration, Inc. has 
during 1981 and 1982, continued seismic studies in Lancaster Sound 
and north Baffin Bay region (AFOA, August, 1980). Results to 
date indicate favorable geological structures , three of which 
Petro-Canada hopes to test by exploratory drilling in water 
depths from 380 to 850 meters, using dynamically positioned 
drill-ships. Petro-Canada expects to submit its proposal with a 
supporting Environmental Impact Statement, during 1982 (Pallister , 
1981). 
Since no exploratory wells have yet been drilled in either 
Lancaster Sound or northern Baffin Bay, proven petroleum resource 
figures and potential field estimates are unavailable. 
If commercial oil fields are discovered , however , both areas 
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are easily accessible and particularly suited to submarine 
transport year round. This has been proven already by a number 
of United States submarines, like "Archerfish", "Skate", "Seadragon", 
and "Queenfish" (McLaren, 1982). 
GREENLAND 
There is considerable interest in the Continental Shelf, 
which runs the entire length of east Greenland; it is one hundred 
to two hundred kilometers wide. The area from Scoresbysund to 
Kronprins Christian Land may consist of sediments identical 
to those off Norway's west coast (Taagholt, 1980). Aero-magnetic 
and seismic observations taken over large areas of the southeastern 
portion by the Danish government in 1979-1980 were positive, and 
deserving of further investigation (Taagholt, 1980). Denmark is 
considering drilling in the Greenland Sea (Gamble, 1979); but 
exploration is difficult due to the large number of icebergs. 
Some exploration has begun in northern Greenland which, because 
it is geologically related to the Arctic Islands, is thought to 
have some potential. The conditions for prospecting are 
particularly favorable there, for as Dr J . Taagholt (1980), 
Danish Scientific Liaison Officer for Greenland, points out, it 
has some of the largest ice-free area in Greenland, and though 
the summers are cold, they are long and very dry. 
Attention has been focussed on Greenland's west coast 
continental shelf, thought favorable for petroleum deposits out 
to water depths of about five hundred meters ru .s. Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1978). When seismic surveys showed there was a sedimentary 
sequence underlying the shelf with large structures , Denmark 
awarded exploration licences for waters between 63° and 70° North 
latitude to six consortiums in 1975 (Ministry of Greenland, 1978). 
The first well, a wildcat, was drilled in two hundred meters of 
water in the Davis Strait in 1976 _(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
1978). Companies such as Chevron, ARCO, and Mobil have subsequently 
drilled further wildcat wells from drill-ships (Geological Survey, 
Greenland, 1979; ~' August, 1978). While there have been some 
indications of gas , results overall have been disappointing 
(Taagholt, 1981). 
Dr Taagholt believes that when oil and gas are located, 
production itself will not be difficult. However, the matter 
of transporting the petroleum to refineries will be. Access to 
northern and eastern coasts is hampered by· severe and variable 
ice conditions. On the western and southern coasts access is 
somewhat easier, because a relatively long summer permits it. 
Over the past several decades, both conventional and nuclear 
submarines have demonstrated an ability to operate in Greenland's 
offshore waters, even in the presence of numerous icebergs 
(McLaren, 1982). If petroleum in commercial quantity is found, 
it is probable that its loading and transport from the northern 
and eastern coasts' production sites in particular, could best 
be accomplished by submarine . 
I 
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CHAPTER V 
PIPELINES AND ICE-BREAKER TANKERS: 
EXISTENT AND PROPOSED PETROLEUM TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
Long and expensive pipelines are currently favored by both 
government and industry for transporting oil and gas from the 
Arctic to southern refineries. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline has 
been in operation since 1977, and more and larger pipelines are 
planned for the future. 
The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline 
The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline is a 800 mile, 48-inch diameter 
pipeline which transports approximately 1.2 million barrels of 
oil from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez each day. Although planning for 
its construction began in 1968 following the discovery of oil at 
Prudhoe Bay (Polar Record, September, 1979), work on what was to 
be the largest privately funded construction effort in history 
did not begin until 1974. It wasn't until the Manhattan Project 
study group (see page 54) concluded that a pipeline was the 
safest . and most efficient means for transporting this newly 
discovered oil, that companies joined to form the Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Company. Then, design and assembly of the pipeline began 
in earnest (British Petroleum, 1977). 
The laying of the pipe was subject to expensive delays, 
as it could not proceed until a series of environmental and 
native land claim issues had been settled (Polar Record, 1977). 
Finally, on May 30, 1977, the last weld was completed; the first 
oil, which takes four and one-half days to travel the length 
, I 
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of the pipe, was on its way to Valdez to be stored . Later, it 
was to be shipped to the United States at a set price of $4.91 
per barrel . This price, established by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, was about a quarter of the world price at that time 
(Polar Record ~ 1977). The Pipeline, with the exception of a 
few minor incidents, has been in operation ever since. 
Although not yet a formal proposal, it has been suggested 
by some authorities that the spare capacity of the Trans-Alaskan 
Pipeline, some 800,000 barrels per day, should be used. It would 
require the construction of more pipeline as a branch to the main 
line to oil sources variously located off the northwest Alaskan 
coast (Bregha, 1979). 
Polar Gas Project 
Although this project has nothing to do with the transport 
of oil, it is a "mega-project" which proposes to use pipeline 
to transport petroleum . It is therefore included in this section. 
It is reasonable to assume that a successful laying of pipe for 
gas transport will contribute to the technology for the transport 
of oil along similar routes, including from the offshore areas. 
The propo~ed pipeline would run from sources in the Arctic Islands, 
the Mackenzie Delta , and the Canadian Beaufort Sea , to southern 
Canadian markets. 
The Polar Gas Project , sponsored by a corporate consortium 
c omposed of Trans-Canada Pipelines, Pan Arctic Oils, Petro-
Canada, Ontario Energy Corporation and Teneco of Canada (Polar 
Record , 1981) , pr opose a " Y" p i pel i ne u p to 3,200 miles l ong 
(O ilweek, February 8, 1982). It wou l d t r anspo r t Arc t i c I s l and 
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and Beaufort Sea gas to southern markets by the early 1990's, 
if things go according to plan (Urquahart, 1982b) . The pipeline 
is expect to cost about %7 billion (in 1978 dollars), and deliver 
up to 93.5 million cubic meters of gas per day (Daks, 1981). 
According to Polar Gas, over $70 million has been spent already 
in developing the technology necessary for the construction, 
some of which will be underwater and in exceedingly difficult 
circumstances. 
Several routing options are technologically feasible. The 
one most likely to be chosen originates from Drake Point, Melville 
Island and proceeds via the M1 Clure Strait. It continues over 
Victoria Island and to the Canadian mainland via Dolphin Strait 
and Union Strait. A later extension would link the gas fields 
near Ellef Ringnes Island with the main line at Melville Island. 
See Figure 14 (Polar Gas Project, 1980). 
Certainly one of the most formidable sections for construction 
will be across the M'Clure Strait, where the pipeline will be 
122 kilometers long, and at depths to 503 meters. Because ice 
islands with drafts as much as 35 meters enter the Strait and scour 
the shallower portions, the pipeline will have to transit from 
land to deep water via tunnels buried up to 50 meters below the 
surface. Permafrost will also be a problem and as is the case 
for all pipelines , engineering will need to be virtually foolproof 
as technical failures during either construction or operation 
would be both difficult and costly to repair (Daks, 1981). 
The Polar Gas Company is working on a revised application 
for submission to Canada's National Energy Board this ye ar , 1982 
(Oilweek, February 8, 1982). To date, none of their construction 
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Figure 14- Proposed Polar Gas Pipeline 
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plans have ~ been subjected to review by any sort of regulatory 
agency, nor has there been an assessment of the potential 
environmental impact (Daks, 1981). 
Alaskan Highway Pipeline 
The greatest of the "mega-projects" planned for the next 
decade is the 5,500 mile Alaskan Highway Gas Pipeline. It is to 
carry natural gas from Prudhoe Bay and the Makenzie Delta to 
southern markets in the United States and Canada. In 1977, a 
joint agreement was signed by the two countries. Since then, 
however, plans have been delayed by a long deadlock in the United 
States Congress over matters of pricing and finance. 
It now appears to be stalled due to a 
lack of financial backers (Whitehorse Star, April 28, 29 and 30, 
1982). At any rate, should it go forward, there are no plans 
to have it draw from Arctic offshore petroleum sources. 
ICE-BREAKER TANKERS 
Next to pipelines, ice-breaker tankers are presently 
considered the most likely means to be developed for transporting 
petroleum from the Arctic. While there are no such tankers yet 
in operation, a. good deal of interest, effort, and money is 
being devoted to their development. 
The Manhattan Project 
The Manhattan Project was designed to determine the feasibility 
of transporting crude oil from the Alaskan North Slope to the 
United States eastern seaboard , using a standard tanker especially 
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modified for Arctic voyages. Information from this experiment 
was then to be applied to the design and building of ice-breaker 
tankers suitable for year round operations in the Arctic. The 
project was sponsored by Humble Oil and other companies, and 
included a general assessment of the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of both tanker and pipeline systems. 
The initial trials took place with the 115,000 ton, 
43,000 shaft horsepower ship. She was fitted out with an ice bow, 
and given especial strenthening to meet the conditions ahead 
of her. Two voyages were conducted: one in the late summer and 
fall of 1969 after the ice-melt, and the other during the spring 
and early summer of 1970 when the ice was at its thickest (United 
States Department of Interior, 1972). The Canadian and United 
States governments assisted by providing ice-breakers, and ice 
reconnaissance and forecasting. The "Manhattan" was trapped in 
the M'Clure Strait en route to Prudhoe Bay on her first voyage . 
On the return route near Greenland, an iceberg fragment punched 
a twenty by thirty foot hole in one of her cargo tanks (Moreau, 
1970). Nevertheless, she was able because of her tonnage, horse-
power and protective features, and the assistance of three ice-
breakers, to carry back a symbolic barrel of oil to the East 
Coast (U.S. Department of Interior, 1972). Although the secondvoyage, 
following a different route, was spoken of as successful, the 
commercial viability of this mode of transport was still apparently 
in doubt (British Petroleum, 1977). 
I n early 1970, Humble Oil awarded a contract to Newport News 
Shipbuilding to develop a class of 250,000 ton ice-breaker tankers, 
each capable of carrying between 1.5 and 1 . 7 million barrels 
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of oil (Sater, 1971) . In late 1970, however, Humble Oil decided 
to discontinue work on commercial tankers (Dosman , 1976). 
In 1973, the United States Maritime Commission sponsored an 
Arctic Marine Commerce Workshop. The Arctic expert delegates, 
drawn from throughout the United States and Canada, expressed 
their strong belief that LNG ships should be employed in the 
Arctic , and recommended that the United States government purchase 
the Manhattan Project test data, which contained valuable information 
on powering performance and hull strength, and on torque overloads 
in the Arctic ice. They felt this information should be released 
to the maritime community (Arctic Institute of North America, 1973). 
There was apparently no response to this request. 
Arctic Pilot Project 
The idea of using ice-breaker tankers in the Canadian Arctic 
was revitalized when the Canadian government-owned corporation, 
Petro-Canada , formed a consortium with Dorne , Melville _Shipping, Ltd . , 
Panarctic Oils, Ltd ., and Trans - Canada Pipelines, to initiate 
an ice-breaker tanker project. This project was to test the 
economic and technical feasibility of producing natural gas from 
Ar ct i c Island wells , of transporting it via a 160 kilometer buried 
pipeline to a terminal on Melville Island , then shipping it via 
ice - br eaker tanker to a regassification plant in either Nova 
Scot i a or Quebec . It was to operate on a y~ar round basis , 
u s i ng Ar c ti c Class VII i ce - br eaker tankers , capable of plowing 
continuously throu gh seven - f oo t t h ick i ce . The p i lot phase of 
the $2.1 billion project, which _ is one-tenth f u l l scale , calls 
for the construction and operation of two g iant double-hulled 
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LNG carrier~, 1,295 feet (375 meters) long, and 135,000 tons. 
Equipped with ice-cutting bows and keels, they are to make sixteen 
round trips annually (Giniger, 1982). See Figure 15. 
Interestingly, the Arctic Pilot Project has seemed not to 
provoke the same degree of opposition as the Arctic Gas Line 
Proposal. Authorities consider the project likely to be approved, 
since it cleared a major regulatory hurdle in November, 1980 
when the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Panel found 
it to be environmentally acceptable, provided certain conditions 
were met (Canadian Arctic Resource Committee, 1980). The project subsequently 
bagan its hearings before National Energy Board in early February, 
1982 (Urquahart,1982a). According to the February 22, 1982 issue 
of Oilweek, plans are to begin shipping gas from eight production 
wells on the Borden Island-main pool, estimated reserves of 
130 billion cubic meters, in the Drake Field. Estimated delivery 
is 1986. 
The Arctic Class X Tanker 
Another tanker project is sponsored by Dome Petroleum. Dome 
is apparently quite far along in the design of a class of Arctic 
ice-breaker tanker which will be able to transport oil from the 
Beaufort Sea to world markets via the "Northwest Passage" year 
round (Brewer, 1982). These 1,280 feet (390 meters), 300,000 ton, 
double-hulled Arctic Class X ice-breaker ta~kers have a cargo 
capacity of 200,000 tons deadweight . With a conventional 
150, OOO shaft horsepower propulsion plant ( double t.he power of 
the Soviet nuclear-powered "Arktika" which went to the North Pole 
in 1977 (Canadian Arctic Resource s Committee, 1979a) designed 
58 
Figure 12. Arctic Pilot Project Ice-Breaker Tanker 
Arctic LNG Carrier 
(from APOA, spring/summer , 1982) 
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to drive it through ice ten feet thick at a speed of six knots 
and about twenty knots in the open ocean, they are scheduled to 
start operating as early as 1986 (Urquahart, 1982a). 
Dome's project looks quite promising. Its technology is 
based upon design features which were tested in a prototype, 
the 3,642 ton ice-breaker "Canmar Kigoriak" built in 1979. 
It was the first ice-breaker to operate year round in Canadian 
Arctic waters. A second and smaller prototype, the "Robert 
LeMeur", is being built for Dome by Burrard Yarrows Corporation, 
Vancouver, and is scheduled for delivery in the summer of 1982. 
The new vessel has many features of the previous one, but will 
incorporate refinements suggested by the testing of its predecessor 
~anada Government of the Northwest Territories, 1982). 
The technology being developed by Dome might certainly be 
applied to the Arctic Pilot Project or even to building tankers 
- to carry Arctic Island oil to world markets. As in the case with 
the ice-breaker LNG tanker envisioned by Petro-Canada, no final 
contract has been awarded for the ice-breaker oil tanker being 
developed by Dome. 
Other Sponsors 
The Canadian Coast Guard awarded a %6,000,000 contract for 
the design of a Class X ice-breaker in 1979, but no follow-up 
contracts have as yet been awarded. The proposed ice-breaker 
would assist ice-breaker tankers being developed by industry 
(Gamble, 1979) . 
In the United States the Maritime Administration commissioned 
a study of a transport system involving ten tankers, which would 
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transport oil from Alaska's North Slope to the East Coast 
(Dosman, 1976). It has not gone beyond a reporting stage 
(Gamble, 1979). 
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CHAPTER VI 
OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARCTIC 
TRANSPORT SYSTEMS 
The obstacles which face those who wish to establish a 
petroleum transport system in the High Arctic are not only physical; 
financial, political, and environmental impact problems must be 
overcome before construction can even begin. This chapter discusses 
these obstacles, and evaluates the relative impact on pipeline 
systems, ice-breaker tanker systems, and giant submarine tanker 
undertakings. The difficulty or ease with which each of these 
transport modes is able to overcome the hurdles as it proceeds 
toward development into a fully operational system, is discussed. 
In proportion with the locality of most of 11 the action", the 
examples given will be mainly Canadian. It does not mean that the 
development of the United States Arctic does not encounter 
equivalent difficulties; it does. 
FINANCIAL OBSTACLES 
The General Problem 
The production of petroleum in the Arctic is not cheap; 
neither will its transport be. As mentioned earlier, the Canadian 
government and Canadian industry have already poured over $800 million 
into Arctic Island petroleum exploration alone and so far without 
a penny in return (Jones, 1981)~ While the United States and 
especially Canada seem determined to develop their Arctic petroleum 
resources as soon .as possible (Daks, 1981), the accomplishments 
are still not adequate to meet the goal of self-sufficiency. 
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As Chapter IV has shown, much oil and gas have been found. The 
technology exists to discover it and in many cases, to produce it. 
But what is lacking, save for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline with 
its own geographical limitations, is a means of transporting 
Arctic petroleum to where it is needed. The development of 
transportation modes will be severely retarded if financial 
backing cannot be found. The recent predicament of the Alaska 
Highway Pipeline well illustrates this point (Whitehorse Star, 
April 28, 29 and 30, 1982). Finding the requisite capital is one 
of the challenges which must be faced. 
It is somewhat ironical that the circumstances which make 
financial backers hesitant to invest in petroleum transportation 
systems would never have arisen had there been opportunity to 
do so earlier. The widespread recession, typified by inflation 
and high interest rates, shows no signs of abating (Newsweek, 
April 12, 1982). In part, the recession is seen to have been 
caused by the " secondary explosion" of oil prices in 1979 and 
1980 (Bareau, 1982a; Financial Times, December 2, 1981). In 
response, conservation measures were taken by many nations, and 
since these were effective, there is now a surplus of oil and gas 
on the market (Vines, 1981). World financial authorities predict 
that as a result of the surplus, and the investmen ts being made 
in the search for synthetic fuels (Huxley, 1982), there will be , 
and continue to be, a substantial lowering of oil prices (Bareau, 
1982b). The net result is that although some authorities predict 
an eventual and perhaps dramatic rise in oil prices (International 
Herald Tribune , May 24, 1982), potential investors see no prospect 
of early returns on any long-term investment in the petroleum 
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industry (Vines, 1981), and hence are reluctant to invest in what 
is now the most critical area of petroleum develop~ent: transport. 
Therefore, it is necessary for petroleum transport systems 
proposed for the Arctic to appeal to potential financial backers. 
In order to to this the project must have a high probability of 
being successfully and quickly accomplished; a market must exist 
for the oil and gas which could be transported; the project must 
in general be cost-effective so that investors could expect an 
attractive and early return on their money. 
Impact on Proposed Transport Systems 
Using these criteria, the present proposals for new pipelines 
may encounter the most difficulty in being financed. Some 
authorities claim that pipelines are still the most economic 
method of transporting liquid and gases (Gorman, 1982), but 
recent examples and estimates indicate otherwise, especially when 
capital costs are included in the economic assessment . Pipelines 
are, historically and potentially, very prone to costly regulatory 
and technological delays (Robinson, 1980; Polar Gas Project, 1980). 
The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline was a prime example of this: it took 
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nine years to construct, at a cost finally of $9.3 billion. This ·rSo. · 
was approximately three times as long, and ten times as much as 
the original estimate (Foster, 1980). 
The proposed Alaskan Highway Pipeline is another example. 
In 1977, the need for its construction was agreed to by both the 
United States and Canada (Arctic Institute of North America, 
1982). Yet because of regulatory delays and inadequate financing , 
construction has not yet begun. The estimated cost of construction 
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has gone up dramatically, from $10 billion in 1970, to an estimated 
$40 to $60 billion now (Whitehorse Star, April 30, 1982). Some 
experts predict that even if it is fully financed, it will not 
be completed by the estimated date of 1987. Further, some 
conjecture that it may never be completed (Nelson, 1982). 
The prospects of the Polar Gas Project are even more open 
to conjecture; the estimated cost was %7 billion in 1978, and 
over $70 million have already been spent on developing the 
necessary technology (Polar Gas Project, 1980). 
The financing prospects for ice-breaker tankers are perhaps 
even less promising than for pipelines, because this completely 
new system involves the development of much new and untried 
technology (Bregha, 1979). Also, if Canada adheres to her 
intention to establish an all-Canadian Arctic marine technology 
and shipbuilding industry, this will in itself be another mega-
project for Canadian industry (Oilweek, March 1, 1982). Canada's 
desire to establish such an industry may well be less than her 
ability to do so; at present, Canada has no shipyards capable. of 
building the proposed tankers, and any design and building in 
the near future will have to be done abroad (Giniger, 1982). 
It is estimated that the pilot phase alone of the Arctic Pilot 
Project will cost about $2.1 billion when its two ice-breaker 
LNG tankers are delivered in 1986 (Urquahart, 1982a). 
Dome Petroleum's fleet of Class XgLant ice-breaker tankers 
would require a sizeable chunk of the $90 billion Dome plans 
to invest in developing the Beaufort Sea (Lloyds' List , February 25, 
1982). If either of the ships under consideration are built, 
they will be "by a large margin the most costly and complicated 
vessels ever built" (Captain T. Pullen, former commander of the 
Canadian ice - breaker " Labrador", quoted in Urquahart, 1982b) . 
While the Canadian government will lend support to the ice-breaker 
tanker projects , the financial backing may still be insufficient . 
Giant submarine tankers , whether proposed by General Dynamics 
or by others, will like ice - breaker tankers, require major new 
technological developments. This is true especially for the 
terminal facilities (U . S . Department of Interior , 1972 ; Nelson , 
1982) . It has been estimated that the capital cost will be in 
the order of %20 billion, which puts it in the same cost range 
as ice-breaker tanker and pipeline proposals. One can expect, 
therefore, that it may continue to experience the same difficulties 
in finding financial backers it has had to date (Robb, 1982). 
Because of the great expense of giant tankers and their associated 
logistical support systems, giant submarine tanker proposals will 
quite likely experience the same difficulty in obtaining sufficient 
fin ancial backing . 
Besides the enormous cost , there is another feature of General 
Dynamics' proposal which may cause hesitation amongst potential 
financial backer s ; it is that General Dynamics would be the builder . 
The proposal calls for construction of an entirely new class of 
s ubmarin e whi ch migh t come u p against t h e highe r pr ior ity Tr iden t 
and " Los An geles" classes o f submar i ne already commi ssioned by 
the United States Navy . These are way behind schedule , and their 
c onst r uct i on has been characterized by multiple problems . On 
April 1, 1981, t h e constr uct i on o f the first Trident submarine, 
the " Ohio", a wa r ded to General Dynami cs i n 1974 , had fallen some 
thirty-two months behind schedule. Deliveries of the twenty-one 
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"Los Angeles" class submarines under construction at General 
Dynamics Electric Boat Division are running eighteen to twenty-
four months behind schedule. The Secretary of the Navy, 
chastising General Dynamics for its failure to live up to contract~ 
stated that "the performance to date [1981] of ••• Electric Boat 
Division ••• does not support its claims that it can handle new 
11 8 work . (Moore, 19 1). 
The submarine LNG tanker proposed by General Dynamics can be 
viewed as a "commercial Trident", privately funded and with all 
the problems associated with building a new complicated design, 
(perhaps five times as many because it is five times as large?). 
Moreover, the construction would have to be done without the 
priorities for the scheduling of material and manpower which the 
military submarine shipbuilding programs command. Thus it is 
unlikely that General Dynamics' submarine super-tanker could. be 
built in a timely manner, both from the standpoint of the 
petroleum ready for transportation, and the investors' need for 
for a capital return in the near future. 
POLITICAL OBSTACLES 
The General Problem 
Whatever transport method is chosen, it must pass through 
land and water which someone owns , has an interest in, or at 
least claims. These jurisdictional issues over the disposition 
and use of territory, whether the concerned party be local groups 
or national governments, must be resolved before any project can 
proceed. Aside from the jurisdictional issues, the course of 
national energy programs greatly influences how proposals for 
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Arctic petroleum transport will be received. Even when a proposal 
may have satisfied government regulatory requirements, the 
government itself may not have satisfied land claims and social 
impact issu~s raised by native groups. Hence the project will be 
further delayed as national policy is established on these issues, 
both in general and in particular. 
Although Alaskan native claims were settled by a Congressional 
Act in 1971 (U.S. Office of Land Claims, 1978), the situation which 
greets developers is still confused and unpredictable. A mixture 
of objections raised by native local governments, native corporate 
groups, and municipal local governments has created an unsettled 
atmosphere, and resulted in a great number of legal actions. 
The North Slope Borough's efforts to regulate Beaufort Sea off-
shore development is a recent example (Arctic Coastal Zone 
Management Newsletter, 1979). 
In Canada, native land claim and social impact issues remain 
for the most part unresolved. The Canadian government· has never 
entered into any agreement or treaty in years past with its 
native peoples directly affected by Beaufort Sea and High Arctic 
petroleum development (Canada Office of Native Claims, 1978). 
The social issues include possible economic impact of any 
construction and operations in or through the area affected by 
the project . They also include the effects of intrusion by 
non-native workers and the overall impact on the community. 
Most authorities agree that such problems would be much less 
complex if land claims could be settled and the natives gain a 
reasonable degree of control over the future economic development 
of their ancestral territories (Canada Office of Native Claims, 1978 ; 
I I 
I 
I 
68 
Daks, 198~). Prime Minister Trudeau's statement at the first 
Constitutional Conference on April 28, 1980 well sums up the 
government's position: 
During the course of the 1970's, we changed our 
mind on aboriginal rights. With the help of your 
educational efforts and some judicial examination of 
the issue, the government accepted the concept of land 
rights accruing without treaties to the original 
inhabitants of this country. We begin negotiating land 
claims arising from these rights, acquired through the 
traditional use and occupan~y of the land. 
( quoted in Canada Indian and Northern Affairs, 1981 ) 
As a result, resolution of native land claim rights will have 
primacy over developmental plans (Canada Lands Directorate 
Environment, 1982). Hence the net effect will be that any project 
which might involve claims negotiation and settlement are at risk 
of being delayed, perhaps for years. The process may also be 
even further complicated by the amendment on native rights in 
Canada's new constitution (Whitehorse Star, April 22 and 26, 1982; 
Padgham , 1982). An example of the impact of this new · emphasis 
on native claims is Judge Berger's recommendation for a ten year 
moratorium on development in the Mackenzie Valley while claims 
are settled. The government declined to accept this recommendation, 
but it influenced the withdrawal of the Arctic Gas Mackenzie 
Valley pipeline proposal. 
In Canada the nationality of the major share holders of an 
initiating corporate consortium will make a ' difference to the 
political obstacles it will be necessary to overcome. The Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf gave Canada in 1958 sovereign 
rights over the continental shelf in the Arctic; this extends 
to the exploration and exploitation of its resources. Therefore, 
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foreign-owned companies and consortiums who intend to work there 
must incorporate in Canada and operate under Canadian permit and 
license; in so doing they expressly recognize Canada's sovereign 
rights (Debell, 1976). 
Canada claims sovereignty over all waters within the Canadian 
Archipelago including the ''Northwest Passage" which must be used 
by all marine modes of transportation. The United States has 
taken the firm position that it is an international strait and 
that Canada's position constitutes a unilateral infringement of 
the freedom of the seas (McConchie and Reid, 1977; Pharand, 1981). 
It remains an issue for resolution at the Third Law of the Sea 
Conference. If resolved in Canada's favor, then non-Canadian 
ships and submarine takers will be subject to her jurisdiction, 
and restrictive acts such as her Shipping Act, which could require 
a licensing fee of one quarter of the market value of the ship 
(Lucas et al, 1978). 
In any case, Canada in support of her own sovereignty position 
passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1970. Under 
the guise of concern with waste disposal, the Act allows Canada 
to regulate the design and operation of all shipping within her 
Arctic waters (Canada Indian and Northern Affairs, 1980a; Daks, 
1981). Canada has also proposed, and the Law of the Sea Conference 
accepted and has written into its negotiating text, a provision 
which allows her to regulate the ice-covered areas of the Arctic 
seas (Canada Arctic Coastal Zone Management Newsletter, 1981) . 
Moreover, if petroleum resource development continues in the 
Beaufort Sea, the matter of a seaward extension of the Yukon/Alaska 
boundary might become an issue between Canada and the United States 
(Dobell , 1976) . 
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Impact on Proposed Transport Systems 
What is perhaps striking about the political obstacles is 
that the questions to be settled may have only marginal connection 
with the subject affected, in this case, petroleum transportation. 
lt is obvious that native land claims are concerned with Arctic 
transport systems to the extent that they are land-based. Thus 
pipelines for example are highly vulnerable, as are tanker systems 
which require large land terminals. It can be expected that 
Dome's ice-breaker tanker, the Polar Gas Project, and any new 
addition to the proposed Norman Wells Pipeline Extension may 
encounter difficulties. The Arctic Pilot Project and submarine 
transport proposal$, because they do not so impose upon the land, 
might seem to be less affected. They will, however, have some 
social and economic impact on native people who are concerned with 
disturbance to the sea-based hunting and fishing economy. It is 
also obvious that if Canada chooses to exercise her sovereignty 
over ,Arctic waters and to regulate activity there, marine modes 
are highly vulnerable to hindrances from that source, if the 
regulations are adversary. 
In summary, it would be fair to say that not all transport 
modes are equally susceptible to a particular type of political/ 
legal/regulatory obstacles; but for each mode, potential regulatory/ 
legal obstructions exist. The extent to which they will be applied 
is not altogether predictable . 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OBSTACLES 
The General Problem 
The science of environmental impact assessment is a new one , 
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and theory and methodology are still evolving. The kinds of 
knowledge that would be most helpful, for instance in the biological 
sciences, are not always developed and available. As a result, 
the process of impact assessment tends to be both long and tentative, 
with the final . opinion relying on a degree of subjective judgement 
(Page, 1981). The problem of building a transport system that 
minimizes environmental pollution and disturbance is a technical one. 
The problem of getting a proposal through various review and 
regulatory stages is a political/processual one. Thus the extent 
to which a project is delayed or requires chang~ on behalf of 
safeguarding the environment is a function of the nature of the 
technology proposed, and of the regulatory process. 
When the Alaskan Beaufort, Chukchi, and Bering Seas petroleum 
fields are ready for a transport system, corporate consortiums 
will have to deal with the United States Federal National 
Environmental Act (NEPA), and the supporting regulatory process. 
Considered by some authorities to be reasonably effecfive (Lang, 
1979), NEPA has to date been characterized by lengthy bureaucratic 
delays, and expensive court challenges by environmental groups 
(Franson and Lucas, 1978; Page, 1981). 
In the Canadian review process, a Canadian owned or incorporated 
company or grou-p of companies that plans to export Canadian oil, 
as the first step has to make application for license to the 
National Energy Board (NEB) . Applicants must submit an assessment 
of the probable environmental impact, including a description of 
the existing environment, and a statement of measures which will 
be taken to minimize impact (Franson and Lucas, 1978) . A sequence 
of preliminary and final hearings then follows. 
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Since impact assessments of sufficient detail have not always 
been demanded or provided under this arrangement, and since NEB 
approval of the project has occurred even before the submission of 
an assessment, a non-statutory Federal Environment Assessment and 
Review Procedure was established in 1974-1975 by Cabinet directive. 
It presently appears to apply only to those extra-governmental 
organizations undertaking projects which are sponsored by a 
/ 
federal department or agency. Thus it would apply to Dome, Petro-
Canada, Panarctic, and most of the other companies mentioned, as 
all are partially government owned. In any case, as all projects 
require approval of one or more of the Federal government depart-
ments - either DIAND for land or Environment for license, every 
project can expect to be referred to FEARO and and its process 
of guidelines, Environmental Impact Statements, public hearings, 
etc. The proposing consortium will have to submit an Initial 
Environmental Evaluation (IEE) if it believes that its project 
has the potential to "cause adverse environmental consequences". 
Then, unless the proposing consortium further determines on its own 
that its project will have "significant environmental consequences", 
it is free to proceed with project planning, using to best advantage 
the information gathered during the IEE (Franson and Lucas, 1977). 
It can be - expected that environmentalists and potentially 
affecte~ native groups, already sensitized to major oil spill and 
pollution problems, will become intervenors in the route to approval . 
Only the Arctic Pilot Project, of the projects discussed in 
this thesis, has actually begun this lengthy review process . 
Its EARP was established in 1977, and it commenced its NEB hearings 
this past February , 1982 (Urquahart, 1982a). The Polar Gas Project 
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is expected to submit its application some time later this year . 
Impact on Proposed Transport Systems 
Experts predict that the Arctic Pilot Project has a good 
chance of speedy approval because liquified natural gas is 
considered environmentally less hazardous than oil . Also , the 
Project is relatively small-scale, with just two ships (Page, 
1981) . The author believes , however, that it will encounter a 
major stumbling block if it delays too long in submitting its EIS . 
Knowledgeable environmentalists and native groups are rapidly 
awakening to the fact that th~ communications and the mating 
habits of marine mammals such as the Bowhead whale could be 
seriously affected by the high radiated noise level from ice-
breaker tankers as they crush through the heavy ice, and as heavy 
propellers churn through the water (Eaton, 1982). The concerns 
for high acoustic noise levels, particularly below 100 Hz, by 
Danish and other delegates at a recent Workshop on Underwater Noise 
and Marine Mammals conducted by the Arctic Pilot Project were 
justified (Peterson, 1981). If absolute sound pressure level 
readin gs were measured by a suitably e quipped and calibrated 
platform , the truth of the matter would be evident in short order . 
Some pr eliminary ex per iments at sea with just me r chant ships or 
average - size tankers will be quite revealing . The author therefore 
predicts that both the Arctic Pilot Project and Dome's proposed 
ice-breaker tanker fleet could encounter serious difficulties in 
gai ning approval because of the high radiated noise levels from 
t h eir t ankers . 
The Greenland government is a l ready on rec ord as be ing 
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strongly opposed to the Arctic Pilot Project (Whitehorse Star, 
March 2, 1982), and is joined by Canada's Inuit Tapirisat (Beer, 
1982). They sense that among other major concerns, the noise 
level will have a profound impact on marine life, and that generally 
the marine environment will be considerably disturbed. 
Generally speaking neither pipelines nor tankers can be said 
to have an exemplary record in regard to oil spills and pollution. 
One has only to recall the gigantic spills of the "Torrey Canyon", 
the "Amoco Cadiz", or the "Kurdis~an" (Livingston, 1981); or to 
read the April 9, 1982 issue of News/North in which its energy 
columnist notes that there was a total of some forty-five pipeline 
failures in 1980 in Canada alone. They spilled some 8,511 cubic 
meters of oil into the surrounding environment. 
How long would it take to locate and repair, and contain the 
oil from a pipeline leak under the ice-covered Beaufort Sea, or 
under the M'Clure Strait, or from an ice-breaker tanker in the 
"Northwest Passage" during the winter months? The fact is that 
the state of the art for dealing with oil spills even on the open 
sea ·or on land is inadequate and unsatisfactory (Page, 1981). An 
oilspill under ice in the Beaufort Sea, in the Arctic Islands, the 
"Northwest Passage", Baffin Bay or the Davis Strait, would be a 
very serious matter, and very difficult to repair and clean up . 
These things must be considered: 
1. Floating ice provides a barrier to the location , repair 
and clean-up of the oil spill. Severe weather does also . 
2. Access difficulties m'ay cause delay in getting containment 
and other necessary equipment to the scene . 
3. Much remains to be learned about Arctic currents; and 
therefore, the spread and travel of oil from a spill at 
a given location is uncertain . 
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4. Cold water hinders the natural breakdown of hydrocarbons. 
(Page, 1981; Wadhams, 1981a) 
And what of submarine tankers and oilspills? The high degree 
of engineering quality control which has ensured watertight 
integrity in submarines already built by shipyards such as Vickers 
Barrow, Howaldtwerke Kiel, Newport News and Mitsubishi are evidence 
of safe construction directly transferable to submarine tankers. 
The probabilities of inadvertent leaks is judged to be extremely low. 
In any case, whatever the probability of environmental damage 
by any proposed transportation mode, the regulatory process promises 
to be lengthy, beset by contention between developers and environ-
mentalists and native groups. The final decision on whether a 
project, especially a mega•project, is given the go-ahead or not 
will likely be made at a very high governmental level. 
PHYSICAL OBSTACLES 
The General Problem 
The , physical environment of the Arctic presents any potential 
developer with a host of technological challenges. How well and 
economically a proposed transport technology will overcome these 
obstacles is, of course, the critical factor in the decision of 
which method(s) to develop . Depending upon the transport technology 
under consideration, ice, snow, permafrost, extreme cold and the 
other conditions which make construction and operation in the Arctic 
difficult and hazardous, present different obstacles and challenges. 
How they affect each transport mode is discussed in the following 
sections . 
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Pipelines 
The laying of pipelines requires a great deal of work on 
s:i.te in the Arctic itself, whereas tankers and submarines can be 
constructed in more agreeable climates. Many pipeline components 
can be manufactured outside the region, but they must be assembled 
on location. Darkness, low temperatures, high winds, and "white 
out" conditions make work difficult if not impossible. The extreme 
cold causes welding and fabrication problems, such as hydrogen 
embrittlement and sulphide cracking (Oilweek, January 25, 1982). 
Within the basic permafrost zone, serious technical problems 
concerning pipeline integrity exist for both oil and gas lines. 
They pose difficult geothermal questions as decisions are made 
on how to control melting and thaw settlement in permafrost, or 
frost heaving, and design suitable safe structures (Page, 1981; 
and others). It should be noted that the lack of a credible 
solution to the frost heave problem on a gas line contributed to 
the final withdrawal of the Arctic Gas Pipeline application 
(Daks, 1981). Even on land, pipeline technology has a long way 
to go before these problems are genuinely solved, and zero defects 
pipeline can be economically manufactured and operated. 
The problems are compounded when the proposed route of the 
pipeline requires construction through and under seawater and ice. 
The proposed Polar Gas Pipeline could have the most difficulties 
in this regard. The necessary technology for the $afe and 
successful in -water construction of pipeline crossing various 
marine channels in the Canadian Archipelago, and particularly, 
in the M1 Clure Strait, will have to be developed. There are 
constant threats of severe damage, particularly at the sea/shore 
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transitions, by ice-scouring from heavy pressure ridges, and 
chunks of ice islands with keels of more than thirty meters. 
They are present in the Beaufort Sea, and they also enter M'Clure 
Strait . A great deal of research remains to be done iri order to 
determine both the sources of these ice islands and pressure 
ridges , and their migratory routes and maximum keel depths 
( Page , 1981 ) • 
Ice : scour will probably be the most critical problem in the 
Beaufort Sea also (Oilweek, January 25, 1982). The constant 
presence of grounded pressure ridge keels, particularly in the 
"Shear Zone" at the edges of the moving pack ice is characterized 
by very heavy pressure ridges (Wadhams, 1980); it results in 
tremendous pressures on the sea bottom for nine months of the year. 
Gouging and scouring have been noted in depths up to sixty meters, 
although they generally average between one-half . and one meter deep; 
on the outer shelf, gouges have been observed as much as five and 
one - half meters deep (Dinter and Grantz, 1981). Very little 
technical data is available on other important characteristics 
like currents , ice thickness and movements, and bathymetry of the 
Beaufort Sea, the Arctic Islands channels, and the 11Northwest 
~ssage". What is known, however, is that conditions are unusually 
severe . Preliminary research indicates that protection for 
pipelines will be required out to depths of forty - five meters in 
some plac es (Kaustinen, 1980) . It has been suggested that enclosing 
or bur ying the p i peline in a spec i al tunnel cut into the bottom 
of the sea may be the best solution (Page, 1981) . It should not 
be forgotten tha t permafrost will also have to be dealt with 
ben eath the sea in both the Arcti c Islands and the Beaufort Sea 
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(Pounder, 1981). On the surface, the constant presence and pressure 
of ice on pipe-laying barges and on the pipe strings themselves as 
they are being put into the water, will not be without difficulty. 
Ice-Breaker Tankers 
The Soviet ice-breakers, 11 Sibir 11 and "Arktika" have demon-
strated to the world that routes can be forged through heavy polar 
ice and even to the North Pole, during the months of May through 
August (Armstrong, 1979). In the North American Arctic, Dome 
Petroleum's new prototype ice-breaker, the "Canmar Kigoriak" 
recently demonstrated a capability to operate in Canadian Arctic 
waters on a year-round basis (Brewer, 1982). 
Despite these recent successes, those contemplating Arctic 
marine transport should not forget the "Manhattan's" difficulties. 
Also, it should be recalled that one of Canada's newest ice-
breakers, the 28,000 ton "M.V. Arctic" wa§_ severely damaged as 
a result of collision with a small iceberg, a "growler", · in 1978 
(Pullen, 1981). Finally, a review of an article on shipping 
losses caused by ice, based on Lloyd ' s Register of Shipping 
Casualty Returns from 1890 to 1977, is illuminating: it lists 
some 253 merchant ships of all nationalities which have been lost 
as a result of collisio.n with, or of being trapped and crushed 
within, the ice. Sizes ranged from 100 tons to the "Titanic", 
46 ,329 tons. Of the ice-caused losses, over 70 have been in the 
North American Arctic (Polar Record, 1979). 
It is not hard to understand why many marine experts wonder 
whether the requisite shipbuilding technology can ever be developed 
to ensure the reliable operation year round of ice-breaker tankers 
'I 
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as proposed by the Arctic Pilot Project and Dome Petroleum. 
While some authorities doubt, others have concluded that the 
recent knowledge and experience gained by Finnish and other ship-
builders in Arctic-like environments such as the Gulf of Bothnia, 
indicate "the ship design technology and this operational 
reliability are now available" (Peters, 1978). 
The successful use of ice-breaker tankers through the 
"Northwest Passage" and in other Arctic waters will depend not 
just on their technological characteristics; the state of the 
surrounding water (ice) will make a difference. Thickness of 
level ice, distribution, and size, depth and frequency of pressure 
ridges, the amount and thickness of multi-year depth of snow 
cover, ice strength and pressure within the pack, and the limits 
of open water areas will all be determinant in the ice-breaker's 
accomplishments (Peters, 1978). The ice-breaker tanker's ultimate 
ability to overcome the resistance posed by these factor-s and 
still be able to proceed safely at an economical speed will be the 
final proof. In any case, the fact remains that at the present 
time, feasibility of year-round navigation as far west in the 
"Northwest Passage" as Melville Island and the M' Clure Strait by 
any type of surface vessel, remains to be proved. See Figure 16. 
Analysis currently being completed by the author for the 
Office of Naval Research indicates that a high frequency of deep 
draft ridges could be a major problem. The analysis is of mid-
channel under-ice profiles taken by United States nuclear submarines 
in the far west area of the "Northwest Passage" during February 
and August, ]960 . In addition, recent environmental background 
reports prepared on the " Northwest Passage" for the Canadian 
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Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs (1980) and the Ministry of 
Transport, indicate that documented observations of ice character-
istics and distribution are only available for the months of May 
through November. Very little is known about ice in the more 
severe conditions typical of the remainder of the year (Canada 
Indian and Northern Affairs, 1980; Norcor, 1978). The reports 
are, however, consistent in their observations that there 
is always a heavy c onsolidation of ice in the Barrow Strait and 
there is a heavy concentration of icebergs, ranging in size from 
5,000 to 5,000,000 tons, which develops in the eastern entrance 
of the "Northwest Passage" during the months of July through 
October as a result of migration from Baffin Bay. 
The·se hazards to ice-breaker tankers are further compounded 
by the fact that the months of July and August are characterized 
by heavy rainfall and fog, and in October, by the year's heaviest 
snow falls (Canada Indian and Northern Affairs, 1980). Moreover, 
high sea states and t .he longer periods of darkness and ·1ow 
visibility which characterize late fall, winter, and early spring 
in Baffin Bay and the Davis Strait, add even further to the 
general dangers of ice-breaker tanker operations in these areas. 
Significantly, a senior Canadian Coast Guard spokesman at NEB 
hearings in Novewber, 1981, revealed that the average and maximum 
wave heights and sea states off the coast of Labrador were "a 
couple of times higher" than Arctic Pilot Project estimates, and 
that " actual ice conditions were more severe " (quoted in Oilweek, 
November 2, 1981). 
The sum total of all these hazards to ice-breaker tanker 
traffic sheds doubt on their viability as a means of transporting 
I , 
I 
I I 
I 
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petroleum- from the High Arctic. Furthermore, the greatest challenge 
for this form of marine transport might not even be the design of 
the ship; the design and construction of deepwater moorings and/or 
terminals might be an even greater task. They must be capable of 
withstanding the dynamic pressures of the pack ice, and be in 
sufficiently deep waters to permit round-the-clock, year-round, 
mooring, loading of oil, and processing of dirty ballast waters -
all this, in an extremely harsh environment (Canadian Arctic 
Resources Committee, 1979a) . 
The Giant Submarine Tanker 
In common with the large ice-breaker tankers, the giant 
submarine tanker requires massive terminal facilities; and will 
face the same technological challenges. But the submarine tanker 
of any size, because it is sub-marine, escapes other problems 
which confront ice-breaker tankers. As Admiral I. Galantin of 
the United States Navy noted: 
A fully laden tanker ploughing a rough sea is 
virtually a submarine constrained to the surface for the 
sake of the top hamper on its few remaining feet of 
freeboard. It requires little imagination and very 
1 simple engineering ' to go all the way in putting the ship 
underwater and producing a simpler, more efficient hull, 
one which can escape the stresses of surface operation 
and which can maintain a higher economic speed . 
(Galantin, 1958) 
Submarine tankers would be operating beneath and clear of 
icebergs and ice fragments, and would not be in constant contact 
or collision with them or the pack ice. Aside from the fact that 
it obviously makes progress much easier, it also reduces to the 
minimum the chances of ice penetrating oil tanks or carriers. 
Figure .1.Z Arctic Submarine Shipping Routes 
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Below the surface, high seas and inclement weather do not matter. 
Neither are they affected by surface visibility. 
The submarine super-tanker may, however, lose some of the 
advantages that existing submarines have in an Arctic environment, 
due to its great size. It is the opinion of several experts that 
"large submarine tankers would be limited severely in both lateral 
and vertical movements in the Beaufort Sea and among the Arctic 
Islands" (US Department of Interior, 1972; and others). They are 
probably too large to respond rapidly and safely to sudden and/or 
unexpected changes in the location and depths of deep draft ice. 
In addition, they would be much too big to be able to surface in 
the average size open lead or polynya. Thus route options are 
reduced, and emergencies which require surfacing could not always 
be responded to in a timely manner. In fact, the size of proposed 
submarine super-tankers is so great that one must question whether 
it should be built at all, for serious maneuverability and ship-
handling problems seem sure to result. If they ever proved 
suitable for Arctic petroleum transport, they would have to be 
limited to deeper offshore areas that might contain commercial 
size deposits, or if the construction of deep water loading 
terminals became technically and economically feasible. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE ARCTIC SUBMARINE AND SUB.MERGED TOW SYSTEM , 
The author proposes that an Arctic petroleum transport system 
made up of small (of a size already proven in Arctic operations), 
powerful, conventionally-powered submarines towing hydrodynamically 
shaped cargo carriers may best meet the petroleum industry's near-
term needs , for at least six months of the year initially and year 
round eventually . 
Such a submarine tow transport system (STTS) is not a 
completely new idea. The concept which involved standard military 
submarines towing small cargo carriers was successfully tested by 
the Germans towards the end of WW II (Rossler, 1981) . In 1958 a 
Dracone Company engineering handout suggested towing their product, 
a flexible neoprene impregnated container, by submarine . The idea 
is mentioned from time to time in periodicals such as the U. S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings (Ruhe , 1970) , and the Naval Research Reviews 
of June, 1973 . Finally, U.S. Navy submarines have towed sizeable 
communication buoys since the early 1970 ' s (Naval Research Reviews, 
July , 1974) . Aside from the Dracone handout, the idea has not 
appeared or been circulated in private industry. 
Assuming that - the petroleum industry or a corporate consortium 
is seriously interested in transporting oil from individual 
production wells in the High Arctic, for example , to potential 
markets before the end of the decade , a prototype of the envisioned 
submarine system which would do just that can be realized and in 
operation within three or four ye a r s (IKl, 1982). This submarine 
would be capable of carrying internally or in towed shapes, 
Iii 
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at least 20,000 barrels of oil. It could be accomplished at 
considerably less risk and at a fraction of the cost of any 
other proposed transport modes. 
Such a submarine and tow system would not require the avail-
ability of one of the world's few very large shipyards. It could 
be designed and built by a wide, and hence cost-competitive, range 
of already experienced conventional submarine designers and ship-
builders . It could, for instance, be constructed in a Canadian 
shipyard employing the design and shipbuilding experience of such 
well-known companies as Ingenieurkontor Lubeck (IKL). The cost 
would be between $100 and $150 million with follow-on production 
models, depending on number, costing less per copy.* 
BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS 
The baseline or prototype submarine would have the following 
capabilities: 
1. Capable of towing two (later four or more) cargo carriers 
in Arctic waters with an initial capacity of at least 
2 . 
* 
10,000 barrels of oil each, at sustained submerged speeds of 
8 kts (later 12), at a maximum operating depth of 600 feet. 
Capable of safely navigating within the harsh environmental 
conditions characteristic of the Beaufort Sea, the Canadian 
Archipelago, Baffin Bay, Davis Strait and Greenland Sea and 
of conducting sustained submerged operations and routinely 
Informa tion from West German submarine design and fabrication 
experts. See also Liibecker Nachrichten, 25 May 1982, concerning 
price of $198 million quoted to the United States Navy for a 
similar size military submarine . 
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breaking through thin ice in these waters; initially from 
early May to late October, ultimately year-round when suitable 
fuel cell or nuclear propulsion plants become available for 
later production model submarines. 
3. Capable of maneuvering to and receiving oil at production 
loading sites and of later transferring the tow or discharging 
oil at open ocean transfer points for subsequent transfer to 
ocean tugs, floating storage tanks or standard tankers or of 
proceeding on to refinery locations in Norway, southern 
Greenland, southern Canada or southern Alaska. 
4. Capable of snorkel transit operations, including quick 
recharge of battery while hovering or proceeding at slow 
speed in open polynyas and leads. 
5. Capable of surface operations. 
6. Capable of contact/obstacle detection, rough classification 
and avoidance while surfaced or submerged. 
7. Capable of oceanographic, bathymetric and seismic survey work 
(when not transporting oil) and of gathering area specific 
information for not only its own future operations but also 
for such things as environmental impact assessments. It 
could even be used to assist in under-ice oil spill containment 
and pollution reduction operations . 
SPECIFICATIONS FOR PROTOTYPE AND EARLY PRODUCTION MODEL 
The preliminary specifications for prototype and early 
production model submarines and tows are as follows: 
(Optimum based on submarine purpose and state of art technology * ) 
* Based on discussions with Professor Gabler and Dr Abels of 
In genieurkontor Lubeck (designers of I KL type 206, 207, 208, 
209, and 1500 class conventional submarines) (See Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. The Arctic Submarine and Submerged Tow System 
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Basic Dimensions 
Submarine-Tug 
Length overall 
89 
226 ft (68.7 m) 
Beam (pressure hull inner diameter) 
Height overall (keel to top of sail) 
Surface displacement (diving trim) 
Submerged displacement 
25.65 ft (7 .82 
47.6 ft ( 14 . 52 
2200 long tons 
2775 long tons 
m) 
m) 
Fuel capacity 220 tons 
Crew 20 
Towed Shapes (two, each containing at least 10,000 barrels of oil) 
Length overall 
Diameter 
Submerged displacement 
Propulsion Plant Data* 
Four high speed Diesel engines 
Type: 
Output : 
Four AC generators 
Output: 
About 150 ft (45.7 m) 
About 20 ft (6.1 m) 
About 1400 long tons 
Motoren~ und _Turbinen~ 
Union GmbH 
(MTU) 12V652 
4 x 950 KW at 1400 RPM 
4 x 870 KW 
* Production models to use fuel cells for propulsion power after 
1986 when they become available on the commercial ma rket 
(Rossler, 1981; Moor e, 1981; Gabler and Abels, 1982) , and 
eventually nuclear power propulsion plans where commercially 
feasib le and politically acceptable 
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Main battery (8 lead acid batteries, 
120 cells each) 
Type: 
Weight (including connectors): 
Wilhelm Hagen 45SP13K 
750 metric tons 
Two DC propulsion motors 
Maximum output: 
One 5-bladed damped, low RPM propeller 
Maximum output: 
Operational Performance (with 2 towed 
Snorkel range at 10 kts: 
Submerged cruising ranges 
8320.5KW total 
8020.9 KW 
bodies) 
(initial total battery capacity of 100% 
discharging to 20%):* 
Speed Duration Range 
2 kts 334.62 hrs 669.2 nm (1,077 km) 
4 kts 141.77 hrs 567.1 nm ( 913 km) 
6 kts 52.71 hrs 316.3 nm ( 509 km) 
8 kts 25.03 hrs 200.2 nm ( 322 km) 
10 kts 12.86 hrs 128.6 nm ( 207 km) 
12 kts 7 .10 hrs 85.2 nm ( 137 km) 
15 kts 3.12 hrs 46.8 nm ( 75 km) 
12,000 nm 
(19,300 km) 
* Based on unpublished analysis conducted for author on IKL's 
Digital VAX/VMS Computer on 25-26 May 1982. 
Depth: 
Maximum Operating: 
Collapse: 
600 ft c 966 m) 
1,200 ft (1 ,930 m) 
"" 
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Electronic 
In general, maximum economical application of space and 
weight-saving technology to equipments, cabling and connectors. 
Navigation: 
Ice avoidance: 
Polynya location 
and sizing, 
Ice thickness: 
Contact/obstacle 
detection, 
classification 
avoidance: 
Communications: 
Special 
Configuration 
Modes: 
Periscopes (2) 
Radar 
Satellite 
High Latitude gyro 
Inertial 
Loran/Omega 
Fathometers (2) 
Passive sonar (for acoustic sea lane/channel 
marker detection and piloting) 
(Damon, 1972) 
Active frequency modulated sonar 
Vertical active acoustic "profiler", 
dual upward side scan sonars 
Passive sonar 
Radar 
Periscopes 
HF 
VHF 
UHF 
Underwater telephone 
Seismic survey 
Bathymetric survey 
Oceanographic Survey 
Environmental monitoring and data collection 
Other 
~ (course and depth) 
control : 
Ballast control: 
Tow control: 
Secondary propulsion 
Atmosphere control 
Crew escape "sphere" 
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Standard electric hydraulic to ensure 
maximum reliability, maneuverability 
and redundancy 
High pressure air, diesel exhaust, 
electropneumatic control 
Kevlar sheathed nylon core for tow; 
fibre optic cable insert for trans-
mission of tow control signals and 
monitoring (i.e. depth, maneuvering, 
ballast, reverse thrust , emergency 
under ice "anchor" release, etc.) 
(Swenson , 1980; Naval Research 
Reviews, 1972; Taylor, 1973; IKL, 1982.) 
Vertical and lateral maneuvering 
thrusters for submarine and each 
towed shape. "Drag" thruster for 
towline, attached by cable to last 
shape (Block, 1982) 
Standard conventional submarine 
sufficient for submerged endurance 
capabilities 
Room for all crew members 
(2.5 m diameter) 
(Gabler, 1975; IKL , 1981) 
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Recent "state of the art" technology can be applied during 
design and construction, if economically feasible, in order to make 
further gains in submerged speed and endurance for given electrical 
propulsion plant capabilities. 
references as indicated). 
(Representative substantiating 
A. Toward Weight Reduction 
1. Pressure hull, "sail", control surfaces, high pressure 
bottles: 
Prototype/early production: 
(a) Hull to be of HY 80 or H.T.S. and of smallest size 
possible (Gabler, 1982) 
(b) Reduction of maximum operating depth to minimum 
required for safe under-ice navigation (thus reducing 
hull thickness and weight) 
Later Production consider use of following materials 
(if economically feasible): 
(a) Use of titanium or aluminum alloys (Naval Research Reviews, 
1972; Reem, 1975; 
Moore, 1981 ) 
(b) Use of organic and metallic matrix composition materials 
(Hettche, 1978; 
Wynne, 1980) 
(c) Use of Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) 
(d) Acrylic 
(Forbes, 1982) 
-- 2 ... Outer hull, . mast fairings: 
(a) Fibreglass (Naval Research Reviews, 
1972) 
3. Major machinery and electronic equipment: 
(a) Reduction of quantity through duality of purpose. 
(b) Use of fibreoptics, coaxial cables 
for signal transmission 
and multiplexing 
(Naval Research Reviews , 
19 72 - 78; Taylor, 1973; 
IKL , 1982) 
(c) Maximum use of microchip, bubble memory, and digital 
micro processor technology ( Moore, 1981; 
Buttner, 1973) 
(d) Use bf multiple high flux density permanent magnets 
to reduce electrical losses and thus permit reduction 
in size of DC propulsion motors. (IKL, 1982) 
(e) Battery lightest weight/highest capacity combination 
Use battery for stability ballast. (Gabler , 1978) 
Consider external mounting outside pressure hull. 
(f) Maximum reliable automation and space remote monitoring 
to further reduce hull and crew size. (Abels, 1978) 
(g) Use of lightweight materials to maximum extent possible 
consistent with long-term safety, reliable operation, 
ballasting and ship's stability requirements . 
4. Towed shape 
(a) Neutrally buoyant. 
(b) Manufactured of strong but light weight materials. 
(c) Internally exposed to sea pressure through collection/ 
expansion tank system (avoids needs for a "pressure 
hull"). 
(d) Necessary control and monitoring components to be 
miniaturized and encapsulated. 
B. Toward Vehicle Drag Reduction 
Overall objective to reduce skin friction by maximizing extent 
of laminar flow over hull form. This will delay onset of turbulence, 
and reduce net force in astern direction due to pressure distribution 
over hull (Goodson, 1974 ; Griffiths and Field, · 1973 ; IKL, 1982). 
1e Submarine and tow hulls, control surfaces : 
Prototype 
(a) Optimum shape for minimum drag. (Gabler, 1982) 
( b) Maximum economical. smoothness, through removal of 
defects and discontinuities. 
Later production 
(a) Polymer coatings 
(b) Polymer ejection 
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(c) Suction slot in boundary layer with stern jet/discharge 
(d) Skin heating 
2. Minimum number of hull projections (control surfaces, 
masts , antennas, etc . ) 
(a) Hydrodynamically shaped or fairin gs for those necessary 
(IKL , 1982) 
C. Efficient Use of Power 
(a) Use of high flux density permanent magnets in electrical 
motors and generators to reduce electrical losses 
(IKL, 1982) 
(b) High speed diesel/generator/high capacity battery 
combination such that battery can be quickly recharged 
(less than an hour) during snorkel operations of 
opportunity (i.e . open polynyas, leads). (Gabler, 1982) 
(c) Latest high capacity battery features; tubular cells, 
parallel power extraction from individual cells, 
internal resistance reduction, maximum specific power. 
(Abels , 1978 ; 
Kruger, 1973) 
(d) Use of snorkel transit when sea ice conditions permit . 
In conclusion , the author proposes the building of a fleet of 
small powerful submarines, and petroleum carriers which can be 
t owed submerged. The proposed prototype or near - term s y stem 
r equir es only the application of suitable available " state of art " 
technology to produce a very competitive and environmentally 
ac c ep t able alternative to ex istent Arctic Petroleum Transport 
s y s t ems and proposals . I t will a l so enabl e the pe t roleum indust ry 
t o begin mor e qu ickl y r ealizing a f inancial r eturn on their 
already substantial investiments in the Arctic . 
I 
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CHAPTER VIII 
ADVANTAGES OF THE ARCTIC SUBMARINE AND SUBMERGED TOW SYSTEM 
It should be emphasized that the basic characteristics, 
including operational capabilities, will be very similar no matter 
whether the proposed Arctic transport submarine is conventionally 
or nuclear powered. In Chapters I and II, mention was made in 
the marginal and fringe areas of the Arctic voyages by the 
conventional submarines of Germany, Russia, the United States and 
Great Britain. The USS "Trigger", for example, penetrated ninety-
seven kilometers under the pack ice in 1957 (Anderson, 1959), and 
during the past two decades, there have been cruises under the ice 
by British conventional submarines, such as the "Amphon", 11 Finback 11 , 
and "Oracle" (Polar Record, 1962; Wadhams, 1972). 
With existing technology, the conventionally powered prototype 
submarine transport proposed by the author could operate submerged 
for over two days at six knots, or for over five days at four knots. 
This is without needing to recharge batteries or replenish the 
atmosphere. Installation of fuel cells in production models of 
the same submarine during the next five years, and eventually 
nuclear power, will increase submerged endurance at these and higher 
speeds dramatically (Gabler, 1982 ) . Ne ither are in the author's 
opinion however, necessary for immediate, successful operation 
during the period May through October. 
The " normal" size of the proposed submarine will allow it to 
maneuver, as others before it have, in all types of water depths, 
including those as shallow as forty meters, like the shallow 
and/or restricted waters of the Bering Strait, the Chukchi Sea, 
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the Beaufort Sea, and within the Canadian Archipelago. It can 
confidently choose its routes beneath the ice, and has many more 
manuevering options than the proposed g iant submarine tan ker, 
because it can surface and submerge as. needed in smaller areas 
of open water. Once submerged, it can maneuver in narrower, 
shallower channels. The vessels of the system will have the 
existing high quality of engineering and construction that is 
requisite for present-day submarines. Hence accidents and failures 
due to material inadequacy or mediocre engineering are far less 
likely to occur than with other kinds of new ships. 
Should the proposed Arctic transport submarine be nuclear-
powered eventually, environmentalists and others should be reassured 
by the fact that the United States, Great Britain, and France have 
built and operated such submarines for over two decades without 
a single incident. 
Its Merits in Regard to Overcoming Financial Obstacles 
The Arctic submarine proposal has been developed so that 
the financially unattractive aspects of the other projects and 
proposals are avoided or minimized. Specifically: 
1. It is not a " mega,-project". It does not require enormous 
investments to have it undertaken . A prototype could be 
built for between $100 and $150 million, with production 
models costing less . 
2. The nature of the system will allow it to be built incrementally , 
and to function almost as soon as the first submarine and tows 
are operative . Because of this, and because it requires a 
much lower threshold volume of oil than do the other alterna-
tives for it to be economically viable, it will be . able to 
earn money almost immediately . Too, it can gr ow as the 
petroleum industry ' s needs dictate. 
I 
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3. Because it relies upon proven technolo g ies, it can be 
expected that delays due to technical problems will be 
minimized; and if they do occur, they will be less costly, 
in scale with the rest of the project. 
4 . It is not restricted in its usefulness to petroleum 
transport or for that matter, even to transport . It can be 
used for other purposes, such as seismic and oceano graphic 
surveys. 
5. Finally, by achieving early operational status, it will be 
able to reap the full benefit of government tax credits 
(Vines , 19 81 ) . 
These are surely advantages in competing for financin g under 
present conditions. 
Its Merits . in Re gard to Overcoming Political and 
Environment.al Impact Obstacles 
The proposal makes no special claim to being able to speed 
what appear to be inherently slow-moving review and regulatory 
processes; or to stabilize the vagaries of national energy policy. 
Like other proposals, it may be either victim or benefactor. 
The Arctic submarine and tow system is, however, categorically 
excluded from some of the issues that other alternatives must 
face : for instance , land claims. Of all the trans port technologies 
discussed , the Arctic submarine makes by f ar the least demand 
on land . Thus it is exempt from native land claim per se . 
It may b e a rgued that it is not exemp t from native " social 
impact " issues , f or it may be seen to infrin g e upon marine - based 
economies . If i t is cha llenged on that account , it will fare 
much better than the alternatives . Unlike ice - break ers , submarines 
d o not d isturb t h e i ce or t he p eople wh o cro s s i t, and by in fer enc e , 
the marine life that would be unsettled by such distur bance. 
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As for noise, because this type of submarine's very survival 
during wartime depended and depends on blending in with the 
ambient sea state and operating with a minimum of radiated noise, 
very effective noise reduction and sound quieting technology has 
been developed; it has been applied by submarine shipbuilding 
yards for years. Thus interference with the communications and 
breeding of marine mammals, and consequent interference with 
native economies, is most unlikely. In short, it is a technology 
of minimum environmental disturbance. 
Its Merits in Regard to Overcoming Physical Obstacles 
The Arctic submarine does not have to overcome obstructing 
ice and harsh weather: it avoids them. Permafrost likewise is 
no problem. What then, might be problematic for successful 
operation of a submarine in Arctic waters? Experienced submariners 
would answer: the need to come to -the surface for routine or 
emergency purposes, in spite of environmental conditions. The 
environmental characteristic of ice-covered areas which makes 
surfacing possible is the presence of polynyas, leads, or thin ice 
"skylights". Without these, surfacing is not usually conducted. 
Need one be overly concerned about the possible absence or 
insufficiency of openings in the waters where the Arctic transport 
submarine would operate? The author believes not. The pack i~e in 
these areas has, generally speaking, no consist.ent thickness. 
The constant fracturing, diverging and compacting of the ice pack 
which occurs due to various combinations of currents, tidal 
fluctuations, winds and upwellings, continuously create areas of 
open water or very thin ice (Sater , 1979; Stirling and Cleator, 1981) . 
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Althou gh their number and size vary with season and location, 
experience with their frequency of occurrence indicates that a 
conventionally powered submarine of adequate submerged endurance 
capacity, and equipped with a pair of upward side-scanning sonars, 
would be able to locate a spot in which to surface. 
The observations of many submariners and oceanographers well 
acquainted with Arctic waters will confirm these conditions 
(Wittman, 1966; Steele, 1962; Calvert, 1959; and others). The 
author's own experience has indicated that at least one polynya 
suitable for surfacing can be found approximately every five miles. 
The USS 11 Seadragon" encountered over 350 polynyas or leads 
of widths 100 meters or greater during her historic la.t'e August 
1960 first submerged transit through Viscount Melville Sound and 
the M'Clure Strait en route the central Beaufort Sea (Steele, 
1960). The investigations and analysis by Dr P. Wadhams of 
under-ice characteristics in the Beaufort Sea, the Greenland Sea 
and the Arctic Ocean, though not specifically addressing the 
the frequency of open water and thin ice areas from the author's 
standpoint, provide further confirmation (Wadhams; 1971, 1977, 
1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981). For example, in the southern Beaufort 
Sea, polynyas or leads of 100 meters width or greater were 
encountered on an average of once every twenty-four kilometers 
during April 1976 (Wadhams and Horne, 1980) and once every 
eight kilometers off north-east Greenland in October 1 976 
( Wadhams, 1981). The work of Dr c. Swithinbank (1 972) in the 
Arctic Ocean, and that of L. LeSchack (1977, 1980) in the Beaufort 
Sea is also supportive of the author ' s observations on the 
frequenc y of open water . 
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In addition, analysis of submarine under-ice profiles of 
Baffin Bay in February and the M'Clure Strait in February and 
August, currently being conducted by the author for the United 
States Office of Naval Research provide even further confirmation. 
For example, statistical analysis reveals a g;reat number of 
polynyas and leads in Baffin Bay and indicates that polynyas or 
leads of widths greater than 100 meters will be encountered on 
an average of once every9.5 kilometers on both sides of the 
M'Clure Strait in February even though average ice thickness 
ranges between 4 and 7 meters (McLaren and others , 1982b). 
(See Figure 19). 
Finally, recent information on the distribution of polynyas 
in the Canadian Arctic indicates the presence of permanent 
navigable leads in Lancaster Sound and the eastern entrance 
to the Northwest Passage and the entrance to the M1 Clure Strait 
during most months of the year (Stirling and Cleator, 1981). 
( See Figure 20). 
Although more observations - certainly those from satellites 
will be of value - and geographically specific analysis during 
all months of the year are desirable for all proposed operating 
areas, it is the author's strong belief that open water and/or 
thin ice are sufficiently frequent as to pose no obstacle to the 
safe, efficient operation of an Arctic transport submarine by 
an experienced crew. 
USS SARGO and USS SEADRAGON .1960. surveys of M'Clure Strait 
Figure 19 
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Figure 20 Map o f the Canadian Arctic, sho win g distribution 
of recurrin g polynyas a nd leads 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
It is hoped by the author that the foregoing has convinced 
the reader that: 
1. Submarines can operate successfully year round in Arctic 
waters. 
2. There is considerable "produceable" oil and gas in the Arctic, 
much of which is offshore. 
3. The existent and usually proposed modes of transport for this 
petroleum - pipelines, ice-breaker tankers and the submarine 
super-tankers - are of questionable suitability, and their 
development is highly problematic. 
4. The Arctic submarine and tow system proposed by the author 
is both a feasible, and a desirable, interim or near-term 
alternative. 
To review the reasons why this is so: 
1. The Arctic submarine and tow system is not a "mega-project". 
Its capital costs, and hence, financial risk, will be 
considerably less than in the case of other Arctic Transport 
systems. 
2. The system can be incrementally developed, financed and 
placed into service. Thus it can be better controlled, and 
would be more responsive to the changing needs of government 
and industry than a "mega-project". 
3. The system's small-scale individual components and conventional 
power plant, and the use of only "off the shelf" proven 
technology will ensure that it can be rapidly and uneventfully 
designed, constructed and delivered by any experienced 
submarine shfpbuilder - unlike a "mega-project". 
4. The system should not require extensive and expensive 
"feasibility" studies. It is essentially .a proven concept 
which can be immediately carried forth through the leadership 
and management of a small, knowledgeable and highly experienced 
(rather than high powered) "tiger team". 
5. There should be much less to contend with in the way of 
environmental impact issues because there will not be noise 
pollution problems and both the probability and scale of an 
oil spill would be considerably less because of the 
inherently high de gree of en g ineerin g and overall quality 
control which characterize submarin e construction . 
Iii 
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6. The system, including the prototype, will be versatile unlike 
a "mega-project" alternative because it can be used for other 
purposes such as seismic, oceanographic, and environmental 
impact surveys. 
7. Because an "Arctic" submarine system already has an essentially 
proven capability for safe and reliable operations in the 
High Arctic, it will not require the development of new or 
additional technology to enable it to "fight" and successfully 
"overcome" the physical environment (i.e. like pipelines and 
ice-breaker tankers). It will, rather, be able to naturally 
and successfully adapt to and blend in with its natural 
habitat - the sea. Hence, the prospects of routine or 
catastrophic damage are considerably less as will be its 
life cycle costs. It will accordingly also be better able 
to adhere to schedules . 
8. The system will not require a proven commercial-sized field 
before it will be economically viable. It can be put to 
work almost immediately after delivery to transport oil 
from individual production wells to which its smaller size 
will permit greater access, to market. Hence it will more 
quickly "earn its keep". 
9. The system will not require the elaborate shipping control, 
search and rescue, emergency assistance or logistics systems 
which "mega-project" marine transport systems will require. 
10. The system will require and can assist in the development 
of terminal and production loading facilities on a much 
smaller scale and cost than what would be required for a 
"mega-project". 
11. The prototype system could be made compatible with and be 
used in further development/refinement of such underwater 
production systems as Shell and Esso's new underwater 
manifold center (Joseph, 1981) and Panarctic's Drake F-76 
subsea flowline bundle (Pallister, .1981). 
12. Although prototype/early production "Arctic submarines" will 
be powered by high capaeity conventional power plants, later 
production models can be nuclear powered if oil price and 
market make this economically viable. 
13. The system can not only serve as a forerunner: it will also 
be able to complement other transport alt~rnatives as High 
Arctic petroleum fields enter full commercial production. 
Despite these many advantages, the author foresees hesitancy 
on the part of government and industry in going forward with such 
a project. This hesitancy may well be based upon other than 
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rational grounds. Submarines, l e t alone submarines under ice, 
are beyond most people's comprehension of what constitutes 
reasonable , safe and straightforward transportation. That 
"visibility", for instance, given today's technology, can be 
better under water than on top does not occur to most people. 
Neither does the notion that below the Arctic ice exists a far 
more unobstructed passage than can ever be laboriously carved 
out by ice-breakers. 
Although a great number of submarines, both conventional 
and nuclear, have been built and used by the world's nations, 
secrecy and silence have characterized the treatment of their 
technological characteristics and their operational capabilities. 
Thus, lack of a real appreciation and general working knowledge 
of submarines may bring the verdict of " high risk" to the author ' s 
proposal, even though it is perhaps the safest, surest mode of 
Arctic petroleum transport of any . 
E . F . Roots of Environment Canada summed up the situation 
well when he said: 
The development of a marine transportation system in the 
Arctic is a problem whose dimensions are set by the 
environment ••• If we succeed in adapting not only our 
technology , but also our modern management practices 
and policies, to the Arctic environment, we may be able 
to take full . advantag e of the unique assets of t h e 
Northern environment . (Roots, 1979) 
To this, the author would add the expansiqn of vision and 
the c on sequent adaptation which this would brin g in decision-
making . 
I: 
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